The Collective Fiduciary by Roth, Lauren R.
Nebraska Law Review
Volume 94 | Issue 3 Article 2
2016
The Collective Fiduciary
Lauren R. Roth
New York University School of Law, lauren.roth@nyu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law, College of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Nebraska Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.
Recommended Citation
Lauren R. Roth, The Collective Fiduciary, 94 Neb. L. Rev. 511 (2015)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr/vol94/iss3/2
Lauren R. Roth*
The Collective Fiduciary
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 511
II. Individual and Collective Fiduciaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 516
A. Fiduciary Powers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 516
B. Fiduciary Duties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 519
C. The Expanding Fiduciary Role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 523
III. The Failure to Hold the Expanding Fiduciary
Accountable Under ERISA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 528
A. Holding Private Actors Accountable: The Role of
Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 529
B. Expanding the Definition of “Fiduciary” . . . . . . . . . . . . 532
C. A Failure of Legal Accountability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 538
IV. How the ACA Continues to Expand the Fiduciary
Role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 541
A. A Right to Healthcare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 541
B. Fiduciary Gatekeepers for Healthcare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 545
V. A Framework for the Collective Fiduciary . . . . . . . . . . . . . 548
A. A Proposal for an Enhanced External Review
Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 550
B. A Proposal to Alter Federal ERISA Common Law . . 553
C. A Proposal for Statistical Limits on Benefit
Denials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 555
VI. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 557
I. INTRODUCTION
The fiduciary developed largely as a legal construct to allow an in-
dividual to perform a task for the benefit of one or a small number of
individuals.  Property was managed.  Estates were distributed.  Em-
ployees were hired.
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But can fiduciaries be made to serve public goals?  I introduce the
concept of the collective fiduciary to signify the shift taking place in
private social welfare benefits towards collective goals and holding fi-
duciaries accountable for the welfare of many instead of one or a few
individuals.  A collective fiduciary is an organization that administers
a social welfare program funded by the government, in whole or in
part, either directly or through tax incentives, on behalf of a large
number of beneficiaries and is bound by fiduciary duties imposed
under common law or statute.  Other scholars have focused on the in-
dividual whose fortunes or health is controlled by a fiduciary, making
it difficult to collect information about fiduciary actions and obtain
consistent, coherent decisions from fiduciaries who control access to
private benefits.  My argument here is that this is not a problem that
can be fixed at the level of the individual fiduciary or individual bene-
ficiary.  Instead, by taking a collective approach, we can help individu-
als by ensuring that fiduciaries meet public targets for benefit
distribution.
With the passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
(ACA),1 millions have or will gain access to health insurance.  Due to
penalties for employers who do not offer the required coverage, many
will enroll in new employer-sponsored health plans subject to the fidu-
ciary regime codified under the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 (ERISA).2  Private health insurance plans are largely sub-
ject to ERISA’s mandates.  However, ERISA contains few substantive
provisions for health plans, which is why any discussion of reforming
the fiduciary framework that governs private health plans must focus
on ERISA.3  Given that many tests, procedures, and expensive medi-
cations require preauthorization by a plan administrator with a fidu-
ciary role, these fiduciaries can restrict access to the very benefits that
many individuals think they are purchasing with health insurance.
1. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), Pub. L. No. 111–148, 124
Stat. 119 (2010); Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L.
No. 111–152, 124 Stat. 1029 (jointly “ACA”).
2. ERISA governs the enactment and maintenance of private employee benefit
plans, such as pension plans and group health plans.  Employers have full discre-
tion to provide, or not provide, benefits and need not act in the best interests of
employees when deciding what form of benefits to offer.  However, once an em-
ployer decides to provide its employees with a benefit plan, ERISA’s fiduciary
duties play a central role.  ERISA, in addition to corresponding Department of
Labor and Internal Revenue Service regulations and federal case law, sets forth
the rules that govern the relationships between these private parties.  ERISA
permits plan participants and their beneficiaries to bring lawsuits in federal
court to challenge a denial of their claims to benefits or the manner in which the
plan is run.  ERISA § 502(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (2012).  ERISA prohibits litiga-
tion of these claims in state courts.  ERISA § 514, 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (2012).
3. See infra section II.C for a discussion of ERISA’s broad preemption clause and
how employers self-insure to fall within ERISA’s orbit, instead of state insurance
law.
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Yet few of these fiduciaries—employees for a large health insurance
company insuring or administering the plan—will ever meet or speak
with the plan beneficiary for whom they are granting or denying
coverage.
Consider the example of a participant in a group health plan sub-
ject to ERISA.  The participant has cancer and seeks approval,
through her doctor or hospital, for treatment.  Her claim is denied by
the insurance company administering her health plan because the
treatment is not considered “medically necessary” for her condition.
Both she and her doctor disagree with the fiduciary’s decision, how-
ever, so she takes the time and effort to figure out her plan’s appeals
process and files a valid appeal of the denial of her benefit claim.  The
fiduciary denies her appeal.  Leaving aside the ACA’s new external
review procedures—which add another layer of appeals and are dis-
cussed further below—the participant then has final option of exert-
ing more time, effort, and money—all while sick with a serious
illness—to go to federal court and ask a judge to review the claim.
The judge, however, will apply a highly deferential standard of review
and ask—on the basis of the administrative record only—whether the
fiduciary’s decision was arbitrary and capricious.
In the example, there is no collective accountability for the fiduci-
ary.  No third party has compared the claims of other, similarly situ-
ated participants decided by the same insurance company as a
measure of internal validity for the decision.  Likewise, no third party
has investigated whether the insurance company is applying the same
definition of care for the participant that other individuals with the
same medical condition receive from competing insurance companies
as a measure of external validity.
The movement under the ACA towards universal healthcare (al-
though not all scholars believe that we have made such a movement
with the statute4) requires us to focus on the relationships of trust
4. Some scholars have argued that the ACA, by establishing universal access to
health insurance, affirmed that healthcare is a universal right. See, e.g., Dayna
Bowen Matthew, Implementing American Health Care Reform: The Fiduciary
Imperative, 59 BUFF. L. REV. 715, 716 (2011).  Other scholars, however, argue
that the ACA never intended to establish universal insurance participation and
settled for dramatically increasing coverage instead because: (1) it does not cover
legal immigrants who have been in the country for less than five years or illegal
immigrants; (2) those for whom insurance premiums are unaffordable are not
required to pay the penalty of the individual mandate; and (3) not everyone who
can enroll will do so, choosing to pay the penalty instead. See, e.g., Mark A. Hall,
Evaluating the Affordable Care Act: The Eye of the Beholder, 51 HOUS. L. REV.
1029, 1033–34 (2014).  Note that this last point is irrelevant if we are focused on
universal access to health insurance, or even to affordable health insurance, in-
stead of universal insurance coverage. See id. at 1034–35 (“Rather than achiev-
ing actual universal coverage, the ACA’s central accomplishment is universal
insurability.  Even if substantial numbers of people remain uninsured, the ACA
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between large organizations providing healthcare or access to health-
care and the populations they serve—abstracting up from the tradi-
tional one-on-one relationship between doctor and patient.5  This
implies that the fiduciary relationship has become a collective under-
taking instead of a direct, personal relationship.  I argue that this
shift started in the pension context but has grown to greater signifi-
cance in the healthcare world, because health and well-being are of
greater salience than even finances.  My concern, however, is first
with the expansion of health insurance and the administration of
health benefits instead of the direct provision of healthcare services.
If patients are denied benefits, then they are effectively denied access
to service providers—be they sole practitioners or growing corpora-
tions of doctors.
This Article examines the expansion of the role of the fiduciary as a
result of growing demand for private welfare benefits in the United
States.  By failing to recognize the new role of the institutional fiduci-
ary serving a large population of beneficiaries, the courts and Con-
gress have declined to hold fiduciaries accountable for the collective
responsibility they take on in a strong system of private welfare bene-
fits.  In a space where the government has been, until now, largely
absent, both by choice and because of a lack of agreement on policy
direction,6 individual decisions by fiduciaries add up to the only large-
scale policy existing for private benefits.7
guarantees everyone the ability to obtain coverage at average community rates.
It does so by prohibiting insurers from turning anyone down, or charging them
more, for health-related reasons.”).
5. See generally Matthew, supra note 4.
6. The American welfare state depends heavily on employers to provide their em-
ployees with social welfare benefits (e.g., health insurance and pensions).  A long
emphasis on self-reliance and small government resulted in years of tax subsidies
encouraging the connection of welfare benefits to work and a uniquely American
path to social security. See JACOB S. HACKER, THE DIVIDED WELFARE STATE: THE
BATTLE OVER PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SOCIAL BENEFITS IN THE UNITED STATES (2002).
Early research on the importance of public-private linkages in the welfare state
showed that private welfare benefits are shaped and subsidized by the govern-
ment through tools such as tax incentives. See generally CHRISTOPHER HOWARD,
THE WELFARE STATE NOBODY KNOWS: DEBUNKING MYTHS ABOUT U.S. SOCIAL POL-
ICY (2007) (arguing that researchers have ignored various policy tools, such as tax
incentives, that make the welfare state larger than the literature suggests); Beth
Stevens, Blurring the Boundaries: How the Federal Government Has Influenced
Welfare Benefits in the Private Sector, in THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN THE
UNITED STATES 123 (Margaret Weir, Ann Shola Orloff & Theda Skocpol eds.,
1988) (discussing the appeal of family and employment policies over direct bu-
reaucratic interventions).
7. Management consultant Peter Drucker called the growth of private pensions an
“unseen revolution” and “an outstanding example of the efficacy of using the ex-
isting private, nongovernmental institutions of our ‘society of organizations’ for
the formulation and achievement of social goals and the satisfaction of social
needs.”  HACKER, supra note 6, at 82.  Political scientist Jacob Hacker, however,
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Though I explore several possible solutions, my preferred proposal
is a system where every fiduciary administering a health plan8 is ac-
knowledged by the fiduciary, the participants and beneficiaries, and
those enforcing the applicable fiduciary duties to be a fiduciary for the
collective—for a large population of insureds.  Further, under this
plan each decision on a claim for benefits is acknowledged by those
parties to have broad implications for the collective given the power
differential and inherent conflict of interest faced by representatives
of large health insurers and administrators between funding benefits
and retaining money for employers and insurance companies.  I argue
that fiduciary duties are only meaningful when denials of benefit
claims are supervised and capped by government actors.
Part II of this Article provides background information on individ-
ual and collective fiduciaries, including the traditional fiduciary role—
both the discretion that is at the heart of fiduciary power and the com-
mon law duties that seek to ensure that fiduciaries use the power to
serve beneficiaries instead of themselves.  I discuss the particular
risks inherent where a fiduciary serves a large number of benefi-
ciaries, an issue that altered the balance of power within traditional
fiduciary relationships and resulted in a need for my collective fiduci-
ary framework.
Part III explores the struggle under ERISA to hold private fiducia-
ries serving a public role in employees’ benefits accountable under the
individual fiduciary framework.  During the decade-long struggle to
pass the legislation, Congress sought to bring within the fiduciary
framework all institutional actors involved in administering private
pension funds.  Yet the absence of sufficient government oversight of
benefit decisions made by fiduciaries with conflicts of interest left ben-
eficiaries with little of the trust in fiduciaries that was previously a
requirement for these relationships to occur.  The application of ER-
ISA to more and more health insurance plans set the stage for fiducia-
ries to restrict meaningful access to health benefits as well.
I argue in Part IV that the ACA has further expanded the fiduciary
role to the point that fiduciaries now act as gatekeepers to fundamen-
tal welfare benefits, tipping the public-private scale towards the for-
mer—requiring a new framework for fiduciary accountability.
Increasing enrollment in health insurance plans as a result of con-
sees danger when welfare policy control is located outside government and the
path of welfare policy can be changed “through stealth.” Id. at 82–83 (“[T]he
politics of private pensions is subterranean politics, only occasionally involving a
broad circle of participants and resisting the scrutiny that public programs typi-
cally invite—even when sizable public resources and recognized national policy
goals hang in the balance.”).
8. While my concept of the collective fiduciary is one that I think can and should be
applied to other areas besides health law, I focus in this Article on that topic and
save discussion of broader applicability for future research.
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gressional efforts to incentivize near universal access to healthcare
has broadened the scope of the problem and brought the government
into prominence in a field that was previously left largely to private
actors to administer.  Changes to the fiduciary framework under ER-
ISA are necessary.
In Part V, after exploring other options to increase accountability, I
propose a new system of collective fiduciary liability for ERISA and
the ACA.  Under my framework, fiduciaries, participants and benefi-
ciaries, and those who enforce ERISA’s fiduciary duties acknowledge
that the decisions fiduciaries make on individual benefit claims create
policy and impact a much larger population.  By force of statute, fidu-
ciaries acknowledge their financial conflicts of interest, accept limits
on their ability to deny benefit claims, and face increased scrutiny by
courts without a deferential standard of review when judging their
initial decisions.
Private fiduciaries can be made to serve public goals, but only if
sufficient accountability is ensured.  The expansion of health insur-
ance under the ACA only adds to the need to remedy long-standing
issues with the accountability of ERISA fiduciaries over fundamental
welfare benefits provided in the United States.
II. INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE FIDUCIARIES
To evaluate fiduciary status and duties as a mechanism for holding
private actors accountable and protecting beneficiaries, whether
under an individual or collective framework, it is necessary to first
explore what it means to be a fiduciary.  I first discuss powers and
duties common to individual and collective fiduciaries, then explain
the need for a distinction between the two categories.  Although ER-
ISA has codified common law fiduciary standards, the courts continue
to inform our understanding of fiduciary powers and duties through
interpretation and enforcement of this statute.  The common law is
therefore at the center of any discussion about who fiduciaries are and
how they can and should behave.  This Part traces the delicate bal-
ance back and forth between power and duty, discretion and restric-
tion.  Finally, I address special risks inherent to fiduciary
relationships that involve large numbers of beneficiaries to emphasize
the need to revise the existing system of accountability.
A. Fiduciary Powers
A clear definition of the fiduciary role in American society is diffi-
cult to ascertain given the many different responsibilities and powers
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that fiduciaries possess.9  As Supreme Court Justice Murphy Frank-
furter wrote:
[T]o say that a man is a fiduciary only begins analysis; it gives direction to
further inquiry.  To whom is he a fiduciary?  What obligations does he owe as
a fiduciary?  In what respect has he failed to discharge these obligations?  And
what are the consequences of his deviation from duty?10
Thus, the heart of the fiduciary concept is the relationship between
the fiduciary and the person who places his trust in that fiduciary (a
beneficiary)11 to accomplish a task.  Generally, a fiduciary relation-
ship forms when one party acts on behalf of another “while exercising
discretion with respect to a critical resource belonging to the benefici-
ary.”12  For example, fiduciary relationships arise because service
providers—such as lawyers, doctors, or investment advisers—offer an
expertise that is not common or easily obtained.13  The parties to a
fiduciary relationship set the initial terms and conditions under which
the property or power will be shared by one with another.  The law
then enforces these terms or sets limits on what the terms may be.14
9. The word “fiduciary” developed in nineteenth-century English courts to describe
relationships of trust existing outside the formal legal meaning of that word as
modern trust law developed to encompass specific agency relationships. See L. S.
Sealy, Fiduciary Relationships, 1962 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 69, 70–71, 74–79 (seeking
to narrow the typically broad definition of fiduciary relationships by classifying
such relationships into four overlapping categories: (1) where a person has con-
trol of the property of another; (2) where a person is given a job by another; (3)
where a person has limited or partial rights to property; and (4) where one person
has undue influence over the other).  Note the focus on the relationship between
one individual and another, rather than institutional fiduciaries and multiple
beneficiaries.
10. TAMAR FRANKEL, FIDUCIARY LAW 2 (2011) (quoting SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318
U.S. 80, 85–86 (1943)).
11. There are various terms used to refer to the person who places his trust in a
fiduciary, such as a “principal” under agency law, a “beneficiary” under trust law,
and a “participant” or “beneficiary” under ERISA.  Professor Tamar Frankel coins
the term “entrustor” for use in her articles and book that explore a unified con-
cept of fiduciary law.  I use the term “beneficiary” in this section since I discuss
fiduciary law in general and the roots of ERISA in trust law.  In discussions re-
lated to ERISA, I use the terms “participant” or “beneficiary.”
12. D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L.
REV. 1399, 1402–04 (2002) (using the term “critical resource” to signify that many
fiduciary relationships are not based on property but instead on another item
“valued by the beneficiary,” such as confidential information).
13. These traditional relationships, including trustee/beneficiary, director/share-
holder, and attorney/client, have been described as “formal,” while many “infor-
mal” relationships of trust have been defined as fiduciary without a clear
explanation for when a relationship based on trust should rightly be called such.
Id. at 1412.
14. FRANKEL, supra note 10, at 8 (providing as an example the entrustment of prop-
erty, which may be considered a trust if the trustor reserves to himself a limited
decision power, but may be classified as an agency if the trustor reserves to him-
self full control over the trustee’s decisions and performance of his services).
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Attempting to provide concrete guidance, Tamar Frankel identifies
three common characteristics of all fiduciary relationships:  (1) “en-
trustment of property or power;” (2) trust of fiduciaries by those bene-
ficiaries who provide them with property or power; and (3) risk to
those beneficiaries.15  This last element, which can also be called the
“potential for opportunism,”16 is the key to the creation of laws regu-
lating fiduciary relationships because when the risk (or potential
costs) of trusting fiduciaries becomes too high, these important rela-
tionships will not take place.17  Laws are imposed to mitigate the risk
involved with trusting another person and prevent harm to those who
give their trust.
Some legal scholars who view fiduciary law as merely a species of
contract law, however, seek to narrow the range of relations brought
within the protective orbit of fiduciary law and the protections them-
selves.  This might include a definition of fiduciary relationships that
does not encompass broadly such relationships as those between doc-
tor and patient or spouses.18  Focusing only on financial relationships
still provides a fiduciary with unwavering discretion to act through
power delegated by the property owner.
As the discussion above illustrates, there is great debate over the
proper definition of a fiduciary and the proper reach of fiduciary du-
ties.  When regulating different relationships of trust, lawmakers and
courts choose who will fall into this fiduciary category.  Lawmakers
and courts also decide whether strict fiduciary protections are re-
quired or if the parties can be left to bargain amongst themselves.
The extensive fiduciary regime of ERISA indicates the importance of
the role of the fiduciary in our ostensibly private social welfare sys-
tem.  Congress decided to define “fiduciary” broadly and subject fiduci-
aries to stringent obligations because of the special vulnerability of
15. Id. at 4 (explaining that, although the definitions of fiduciaries contain more de-
tailed elements that distinguish one species of fiduciaries from another, these
differences all derive from these three elements).
16. Smith, supra note 12, at 1444 (asserting that the “main focus in fiduciary duty
cases is the potential for opportunism” on the part of the fiduciary, and explain-
ing that “[w]hether the existence of a particular thing justifies the imposition of
fiduciary duties  . . . depends on whether that thing provides the fiduciary with
the occasion to act opportunistically”).
17. Without an information asymmetry, there is no incentive to hire the fiduciary for
his advice and services, but this very asymmetry requires regulation.  Benjamin
Cummings & Michael Finke, The Economics of Fiduciary Investment Advice
(Sept. 1, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/NB6Q
-UEMF.
18. Larry E. Ribstein, Fencing Fiduciary Duties, 91 B.U. L. REV. 899, 901 (2011) (ex-
plaining that his definition of a fiduciary as one who has “open-ended manage-
ment power over property without corresponding economic rights” focuses on the
particular type of entrustment that arises from a property owner’s delegation to a
manager of open-ended management power over property by contract alone).
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beneficiaries in this context.  I therefore take as my starting point for
ensuring sufficient accountability that an expansive definition of fidu-
ciary is both appropriate and necessary, and that contract law pro-
vides insufficient protection for these relationships.
B. Fiduciary Duties
Most discussions of fiduciary duties focus on the duty of loyalty and
the duty of care.19  Even if it is difficult at times to define precisely
who is a fiduciary or what a fiduciary does, fiduciary obligations pro-
vide the reassurance necessary for these relationships of trust to oc-
cur.  Private actors’ behavior is limited by the fiduciary standards
contained in a statute or set by common law, but standards necessa-
rily sacrifice certainty in their application for flexibility to cover a va-
riety of circumstances and prevent having to revisit a rule each time a
new set of facts arises to which it is applied.20  Much discretion, and
therefore power, is placed in the hands of fiduciaries, as explained by
legal theorist H. L. A. Hart:
It is a feature of the human predicament (and so of the legislative one) that we
labour under two connected handicaps whenever we seek to regulate, unam-
biguously and in advance, some sphere of conduct by means of general stan-
dards to be used without further official direction on particular occasions.  The
first handicap is our relative ignorance of fact; the second is our relative inde-
terminacy of aim.21
The duty of loyalty requires that fiduciaries act solely in the inter-
est of beneficiaries.22  The duty requires that fiduciaries avoid self-
interested behavior when “exercising discretion with respect to the
beneficiary’s critical resources.”23  The duty of loyalty also requires
that the fiduciary adhere to instructions provided by the beneficiary,
19. See Smith, supra note 12, at 1409–10 (asserting that fiduciaries are expected to
be more careful about self-interested behavior than a party merely engaged in a
contractual relationship with another because the fiduciary relationship is not
limited by the four corners of the contract).
20. H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 124–28 (1961).
21. Id. at 125.
22. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 394 (1958) (“Unless otherwise agreed,
an agent is subject to a duty not to act or to agree to act during the period of his
agency for persons whose interests conflict with those of the principal in matters
in which the agent is employed.”); Ribstein, supra note 18, at 208–10 (asserting
that this is the only true fiduciary duty and other related “non-fiduciary” duties,
such as the duty of care, are implied in contract); Smith, supra note 12, at
1406–07, 1409 (arguing that fiduciary duty refers only to the duty of loyalty be-
cause “the duty of care is ‘not distinctively fiduciary’”).  Regardless of how one
may define the concept of fiduciary duty using legal history, Congress defined
fiduciary duty to include the duty of care under ERISA.
23. Smith, supra note 12, at 1402 (explaining that self-interested behavior consti-
tutes a wrong when the fiduciary does or has something that is inconsistent with
the beneficiary’s interest in the critical resource).
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act in good faith, and account to the beneficiary (disclose
information).24
Disloyalty typically occurs when there is a conflict between the fi-
duciary’s interests and the beneficiary’s interests, but a conflict may
also involve representing multiple beneficiaries with conflicting inter-
ests.  Disloyalty can occur in three scenarios.  First, the fiduciary may
use his position (without the beneficiary’s consent) to direct business
opportunities to himself (self-dealing).  For example, the fiduciary
could pass himself off as the owner of the trust property and use it as
collateral to purchase additional property.  Second, the fiduciary
might transact for the beneficiary with his or the court’s consent but
gain such consent due to inadequate disclosure.  For example, the fi-
duciary may invest the beneficiary’s assets with the beneficiary’s con-
sent but not tell the beneficiary that the company he is investing in is
owned by the fiduciary’s brother.  Third, the fiduciary could transact
with a third party in a way that implicates the beneficiary’s interests,
such as misappropriating an opportunity and pursuing “secret prof-
its.”25  For example, imagine a buyer of real estate purchase a house
from a seller through the seller’s real estate agent.  The agent, a fidu-
ciary, may know that the price offered is above the seller’s minimum
sales price but choose to pocket the difference without informing the
seller.26
Since delegating discretion to a fiduciary necessarily involves ced-
ing control, the difficulty with penalizing breaches of the duty of loy-
alty is discovering them.  A poor outcome (such as a negative return on
investment) does not necessarily mean that the fiduciary has engaged
in a self-interested act (such as misappropriating all or part of the
value of property entrusted to the fiduciary).  While the beneficiary
can observe the outcome, because the outcome is based both on the
fiduciary’s act and chance, it is difficult to tell whether the fiduciary’s
act or chance caused the poor outcome.27  In addition, the more effort
the beneficiary must expend in monitoring a fiduciary to prevent a
breach of this duty, the less reason there is for the existence of the
24. FRANKEL, supra note 10, at 108, 122, 129.  Although these duties are related to
the duty of loyalty, they are frequently cited as distinct duties.
25. Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, An Economic Model of the Fiduciary’s
Duty of Loyalty, 10 TEL AVIV U. STUD. L. 297, 297–306 (1990) (explaining further
that the duty of loyalty can be understood as a special set of rules designed to
deter such behavior).
26. Deborah A. DeMott, Disloyal Agents, 58 ALA. L. REV. 1049, 1053 (2007) (stating
that however the agency relationships among the parties may have been struc-
tured—the agent represented the seller, buyer and seller, or just the buyer—the
conduct was disloyal).
27. Cooter & Freedman, supra note 25, at 300–01 (using a model to explain that
“[t]he interaction of conduct and chance prevents the principal from inferring the
agent’s act with certainty” and, as a result, “the principal must guess whether the
agent’s act was other-regarding or self-regarding”).
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fiduciary relationship at all since the costs may begin to exceed the
benefits.
Penalties for breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty under common
law seek to rectify this situation.  The duty of loyalty carries remedies
taken from the law of contracts, torts, restitution, and unjust enrich-
ment.28  If the only remedy were disgorgement of ill-gotten gains,
given imperfect enforcement, there would still be a large incentive for
the fiduciary to breach his duty.  More is needed to deter improper
conduct.29  The aggrieved party need only demonstrate that the fiduci-
ary’s actions were a substantial factor in a loss to the beneficiary—a
low threshold.  Once this burden is met, the beneficiary may be enti-
tled to punitive damages in addition to requiring the fiduciary to dis-
gorge any gains received through improper use of the beneficiary’s
property (even if the beneficiary was not harmed at all by the
breach).30  The deterrent value of these remedies demonstrates the
importance at law of preventing breaches of the fiduciary duty of loy-
alty.31  The prohibitions on self-interested behavior by fiduciaries do
not seek to prevent all self-dealing, however.  Rather, they promote
advance disclosure to the beneficiary so that he can make an informed
decision on whether to consent to the transaction.32  The fiduciary’s
ability to obtain advance consent and his ability to terminate the rela-
tionship soften the harshness of remedies for breach of the duty of
loyalty.33  The high cost of penalties for fiduciary breaches has not de-
28. DeMott, supra note 26, at 1049.
29. Cooter & Freedman, supra note 25, at 304 (explaining that if the plaintiff, or
principal, has the burden of detecting and proving the agent’s breach of duty, the
probability of a sanction will be low, which would cause the expected sanction to
be less than the gain from wrongdoing).  The lack of sufficient remedies for ER-
ISA benefit claims has been criticized for exactly this reason.
30. DeMott, supra note 26, at 1056.
31. Remedies for incorrectly decided benefit claims under ERISA, however, are lim-
ited. See Katherine T. Vukadin, Hope or Hype?: Why the Affordable Care Act’s
New External Review Rules for Denied ERISA Healthcare Claims Need More Re-
form, 60 BUFF. L. REV. 1201, 1219 (2012) (citing DiFelice v. Aetna U.S. Health-
care, 346 F.3d 442, 456 (3d Cir. 2003) (Becker, J., concurring) (“[V]irtually all
state law remedies are preempted [by ERISA] but very few federal substitutes
are provided.”)).
32. Robert H. Sitkoff, The Economic Structure of Fiduciary Law, 91 B.U. L. REV.
1039, 1043 (2011) (“The aim [of procedural and substantive safeguards designed
to enforce the duty of loyalty] is to induce the fiduciary either to refrain from self-
dealing or to disclose the material facts of the transaction and how the fiduciary’s
conflict might compromise the fiduciary’s judgment . . . .”).
33. DeMott, supra note 26, at 1052–53. But see Donald C. Langevoort, Psychological
Perspectives on the Fiduciary Business, 91 B.U. L. REV. 995, 1003 n.30 (2011)
(discussing how disclosure may give fiduciaries “greater moral wiggle room” and
result in greater acceptance of their advice among beneficiaries).  Even when
aware of a conflict of interest, beneficiaries rarely have full information about
how that conflict has affected a fiduciary’s advice, frequently discounting possible
bias or at least exhibiting an increased tendency to accept the advice based on the
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terred many from entering the field—providing fiduciary services has
become a big business with big profits.  As a result, there is frequently
a culture at companies that serve as fiduciaries that motivates greed
and self-dealing instead of ethical behavior.34
The second major fiduciary duty, the duty of care, requires fiducia-
ries to act “with prudence, attention, and proficiency” in providing
their services.35  Fiduciaries must have or obtain the information re-
quired to competently perform their tasks and act on such information
after engaging in a reasonable deliberative process.36  The perform-
ance of a fiduciary with specialized training and skills is measured by
the standard of what a “reasonable or prudent person” with those
skills would have done in the same circumstances.37  This standard
does not hold fiduciaries liable for mistakes or unfavorable outcomes
but instead for failing to complete their duties in a professional
manner.38
Measuring performance, however, is difficult.  Even courts must
rely on other experts to judge fiduciaries’ performance.39  As with the
duty of loyalty, it is difficult to determine whether the fiduciary has
existing relationship of trust.  Although an experiment by Bryan Church and Xi
(Jason) Kuang, see Bryan K. Church & Xi (Jason) Kuang, Conflicts of Interest,
Disclosure, and (Costly) Sanctions: Experimental Evidence, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 505
(2009), finds that disclosure and the threat of sanctions in the financial adviser/
advisee context resulted in less biased advice by the adviser and better evalua-
tion of that advice by advisee, their experiment models sanctions as costly for the
beneficiaries but certain to result in punishment where the fiduciary engages in
bad behavior.  The experiment also assumes the advisee has complete freedom
regarding whether to invest or not and that the relationship is a one-time interac-
tion—an unrealistic scenario because pension plan participants, for example, do
not choose the plan’s financial adviser(s), and most adviser/advisee relationships
involve repeated interaction.  Langevoort, supra note 33, at 1003 n.30.
34. Langevoort, supra note 33, at 995 (“It is thus worth thinking hard about what the
favored traits are in the fiduciary business and how they interact with—and eas-
ily frustrate—the law’s efforts to insist on fiduciary responsibility from those who
are, in heart and soul, salespeople.”).
35. FRANKEL, supra note 10, at 169.  Like Ribstein and Smith, William A. Gregory
argues that the duty of care is not a fiduciary duty at all but instead a negligence
concept that has been conflated with the fiduciary duty of loyalty by courts and
legal scholars. See William A. Gregory, The Fiduciary Duty of Care: A Perversion
of Words, 38 AKRON L. REV. 181, 183 (2005) (“To describe negligent acts as being
breaches of fiduciary duty is misleading, because a breach of fiduciary duty ‘con-
notes disloyalty or infidelity. Mere incompetence is not enough.’”).  Gregory’s
point is that only duties that are unique to the fiduciary role are fiduciary duties.
Instead, he argues that the duty of care always falls under tort law. Id. at 188.
36. Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its Economic
Character and Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045, 1062 (1991) (“Suc-
cessful management of an asset requires judgment, and the fiduciary’s duty of
care applies to the process of making this judgment.”).
37. Sitkoff, supra note 32, at 1044.
38. FRANKEL, supra note 10, at 170–74.
39. Id.
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used “reasonable” effort based on outcome since, in the absence of dis-
loyalty, a poor outcome can result from either poor effort or chance.40
Courts typically evaluate the “process” used by the fiduciary to fulfill
his role.41  Unscrupulous intent is not required to find a breach of this
duty.42
My focus in this Article is on the duty of loyalty because it is more
likely to result in systematic erroneous denials of benefit claims.  Im-
proper decisions on benefit claims due to breaches of the duty of care
should result in both false positives (granting claims that should have
been denied) and false negatives (denying claims that should have
been granted).  These errors should cancel out and not produce overall
bias against participants and beneficiaries or a subset of participants
and beneficiaries, such as the poor or racial minorities who are per-
haps less likely to appeal incorrect decisions (though we lack data on
the numbers and types of claims denied and subsequently
appealed).43
C. The Expanding Fiduciary Role
Traditionally, fiduciary relationships occurred between one fiduci-
ary and one or a small number of beneficiaries.44  Thus, the rules de-
signed to hold fiduciaries accountable developed in this context and
did not contemplate the rise of less personal and direct relationships
40. Cooter & Freedman, supra note 36, at 1056–57; see Arthur B. Laby, Resolving
Conflicts of Duty in Fiduciary Relationships, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 75, 119 (2004)
(“Whether the trustee is prudent in the doing of an act depends upon the circum-
stances as they reasonably appear to him at the time when he does the act and
not at some subsequent time when his conduct is called in question.” (quoting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 174 cmt. b (1959))).
41. Laby, supra note 40, at 117.
42. Id. at 109.  Professor Arthur Laby argues that the negative duty of loyalty trumps
the positive duty of care.  This emphasizes the importance of trust in the relation-
ship between fiduciary and beneficiary rather than the quality of services pro-
vided.  One example of how the two duties can conflict in the ERISA context was
faced by Enron directors who also served as administrators of the company’s ER-
ISA plans that invested in company stock.  The court found that the plaintiffs
stated a claim for breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty to ERISA plan partici-
pants even though any disclosure of the company’s precarious financial condition
by the directors would arguably have violated their fiduciary duty of care to the
company. Id. at 141–45.
43. When I mention “improper,” “erroneous,” or “incorrect” decisions by fiduciaries of
benefit claims, I include not just clear errors but all decisions that are part of a
concerted effort to ensure that all close calls or decisions based on ambiguous or
vague plan terms are decided in the administrator’s or employer’s favor.  If bias
as a result of a financial conflict of interest were not at play, I would expect to
find that half of such claims are granted and half are denied.  Given my focus on
collective fairness and justice, I consider these decisions improper, erroneous, and
incorrect.
44. See Sealy, supra note 9 (discussing traditional and modern fiduciary relation-
ships in the context of relationships between A and B).
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between institutional fiduciaries and large numbers of beneficiaries
that exist today.
Yet the rise of the modern corporation with its larger workforce
and the parallel move of workers from the farm to the city resulted in
fiduciaries performing tasks for an ever-growing number of benefi-
ciaries.  It also resulted in the growth of institutional fiduciaries, pro-
viding services to both corporations and hundreds or thousands or
beneficiaries.
The growth of modern employee benefits contributed substantially
to the expanding role of the fiduciary.  As private pension plans be-
came increasingly attractive to industrial workers left without the
family support of an agrarian society (and to businesses seeking to
push older, less productive workers out of the workforce), employers
outsourced plan design and maintenance—including investment
advice.45
However, common law restraints on fiduciaries were a poor fit for
these new, institutional fiduciary/mass beneficiary relationships that
developed to provide a valued safety net to workers.  Early on, pension
benefits were considered a gratuity, and even as the courts began to
recognize pension rights fiduciaries successfully found ways to opt out
of liability—not to mention the many individuals and entities involved
in pension plan administration who were not considered fiduciaries at
all.46  Scandals arose surrounding improper management of pension
funds and broken promises to workers.47
Typically, as the number of beneficiaries increases, the total
amount of property (e.g., money) that the fiduciary is responsible for
increases.  As is often the case, with more money comes more power
for the fiduciary.  Among other responsibilities, fiduciaries select ser-
vice providers to help manage assets, such as lawyers and investment
advisers.  These third parties compete to please the fiduciaries that
hire them—not the beneficiaries who own the assets or rights to the
45. Plans consulted actuaries, lawyers, and investment managers who remained
loyal to the employers that hired them.  These consultants largely customized
pension plans to suit the needs of employers rather than employees. See STEVEN
A. SASS, THE PROMISE OF PRIVATE PENSIONS: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS 156–78
(1997) (quoting pension consultants that argue “[a]ny course of action which
leads to a stronger company, better able to weather occasional financial reverses,
and to meet competition, may enhance the security of the employees as a
whole . . . .”).
46. See, e.g., Lauren R. Roth, A Failure to Supervise: How the Bureaucracy and the
Courts Abandoned Their Intended Roles Under ERISA, 34 PACE L. REV. 216,
220–33 (2014) (reviewing courts’ treatment of pension promises prior to ERISA).
47. See SASS, supra note 45, at 192 (discussing investigations during the 1950s into
mismanagement of pension funds by labor union officials).  This disjuncture be-
tween common law fiduciary duties and the needs of workers eventually resulted
in the passage of ERISA, which included an expanded definition of who was con-
sidered a fiduciary.
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assets.  Two consequences are: (1) externally, it becomes difficult for
those doing business with a fiduciary to distinguish whether he man-
ages the assets or owns the assets and (2) internally, each benefici-
ary’s control over the fiduciary is weakened because of the small share
of his ownership.48  The first consequence leads to greater temptation
to breach the duty of loyalty, as discussed above, and an increased
ability to do so given his apparent ownership of the assets managed.
My focus, however, is the distinct difficulty in controlling the fiduciary
internally as the number of beneficiaries increases.
Acting as a fiduciary to a large number of beneficiaries is a public-
service role even when performed by supposedly private actors.  In a
1995 article, Frankel defines “public fiduciaries” as those engaged in
“commercial relationships, that is, mass-produced, non-personal rela-
tionships with numerous public [beneficiaries]” and “private fiducia-
ries” as only those in relationships with few beneficiaries.49  She
identifies two categories of public fiduciaries: (1) fiduciaries who man-
age large pools of assets for efficiency (e.g., pension fund managers)
and (2) fiduciaries to entities owned by many beneficiaries (e.g., direc-
tors of public corporations).50  The first category, which I focus on in
this section, is typically regulated by law as private fiduciaries.  I de-
fine public fiduciaries to include only government actors (e.g., con-
gressmen or employees of government agencies) and not fiduciaries to
mass amounts of beneficiaries to tease out the differences between pri-
vate parties supplying services to the mass public and government ac-
tors doing the same.  Frankel’s terminology, however, indicates the
easy comparison between her public fiduciaries and government ac-
tors and the extent of the powers held by fiduciaries in relationships
with many beneficiaries.51
48. FRANKEL, supra note 10, at 11 (explaining that these consequences are the reason
that fiduciaries that serve numerous beneficiaries in a standardized manner ac-
quire power that is greater than the power of fiduciaries that serve individuals,
even if the individual beneficiaries are very wealthy).
49. Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Duties as Default Rules, 74 OR. L. REV. 1209, 1251–52
(1995).
50. Id. at 1252 n.117.
51. The Founding Fathers were acquainted with fiduciary law. See David L. Ponet &
Ethan J. Leib, Fiduciary Law’s Lessons for Deliberative Democracy, 91 B.U. L.
REV. 1249, 1254 n.34 (2011) (providing a list of writings by the Founding Fathers
in which they discuss fiduciary law and the government’s role in preserving prop-
erty rights).  They therefore set forth the terms governing public fiduciaries’ per-
formance of their duties just as the parties to a private fiduciary relationship
agree on basic terms to govern their relationship. FRANKEL, supra note 10, at
281–82.  At the federal Constitutional Convention in 1787, many delegates es-
poused “ideals of fiduciary government,” drawing on concepts already contained
within state constitutions.  Robert G. Natelson, The Constitution and the Public
Trust, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 1077, 1084 n.19 (2004) [hereinafter Natelson, Public
Trust] (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 49 (James Madison)). This comparison of pub-
lic officials and private fiduciaries is known as the public trust doctrine. See id.
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Frankel recognizes that fiduciaries who provide services to a large
number of beneficiaries have significant power because the benefi-
ciaries are “rationally passive,” meaning that the cost for an individ-
ual beneficiary to monitor a fiduciary exceeds the small benefit to the
beneficiary that results because of his small share of ownership.52  A
fiduciary managing property for many beneficiaries cannot be subject
to the direction of each beneficiary on a daily basis—that would make
managing the property impractical and defeat the purpose of central-
izing management to increase efficiency.  With a large number of ben-
eficiaries, it is more likely that each has a small financial interest and
will not rationally expend the large amount of time, effort, and money
necessary to monitor or remove the fiduciary for the entire group and
will instead “free ride” on the effort of any active investors.53  “A fidu-
ciary managing $500 million for one [beneficiary] has far less power
than a fiduciary managing the same amount for 50,000 [benefi-
ciaries].”54  Fiduciaries controlling the property of a large number of
beneficiaries also have more power to affect the economy and financial
order of our society.  If beneficiaries feel powerless to control bad be-
havior among fiduciaries—if, for example, strong legal standards do
not restrict fiduciary malfeasance—they may withdraw from the sys-
tem entirely.55  Frankel argues that the more beneficiaries, the more
strict regulation of fiduciaries and remedies for breaches of these rules
should be.56
at 1087; Robert G. Natelson, The Government as Fiduciary: A Practical Demon-
stration from the Reign of Trajan, 35 U. RICH. L. REV. 191, 192 (2001) (“We are
the trustees and agents of our fellow citizens.” (quoting Grover Cleveland)).  The
public trust doctrine, as set forth by Robert G. Natelson but nowhere formally
required of elected officials, includes: (1) a duty to follow instructions, such as
those outlined in the Constitution; (2) a duty of reasonable care; (3) a duty of
loyalty; (4) a duty of impartiality, which requires that public officials not favor
one group of citizens over another; and (5) a duty to account for their actions,
including remedying harm (although this is limited in the case of public officials).
Natelson, Public Trust, supra note 51, at 1088, 1091.  The parallels between the
duties owed by a private fiduciary, as discussed above, and the duties owed by a
public fiduciary are clear.
52. Frankel, supra note 49, at 1252–53.
53. Id. at 1256; see generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUB-
LIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1971)
54. Frankel, supra note 49, at 1257.  One interesting point about the rational passiv-
ity of beneficiaries participating in these mass fiduciary relationships is that the
larger the number of beneficiaries gets, the less incentive each individual benefi-
ciary has to monitor the fiduciary or to attempt to influence the relationship.
Ironically, the larger the number of those with health insurance, the less power
each insured has with respect to his or her benefit claims (assuming the number
of players providing insurance does not increase proportionately).
55. Id. at 1259–60.
56. Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law in the Twenty-First Century, 91 B.U. L. REV.
1289, 1297 (2011).  There is an inverse relationship between private and public
fiduciary power, however, once Congress decides to regulate a particular field.
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With respect to the nature of the mass fiduciary role, not only are
these mass fiduciaries more difficult to control than fiduciaries in-
volved in more typical agency relationships because of the need to cen-
tralize management and gain distance from individual beneficiaries,
but exit from the relationship is also more difficult.57  On this first
point, institutional fiduciaries are now hired to serve large numbers of
beneficiaries precisely because they can streamline administration
and save costs.  The cost-saving motivation of necessity prioritizes effi-
ciency over personal contact and a focus on the overall needs of the
plan instead of the needs of individual beneficiaries.  On the second
point, where the employer or health insurance company sponsoring or
administering a health insurance plan selects the fiduciaries and the
decision is not up for a vote or individual input, exit involves switching
employers or health insurance plans—a decision with other costs and
drawbacks.  Finally, the last reason the nature of the mass fiduciary
relationship results in greater power for fiduciaries is that they design
the package of services they provide themselves instead of the more
customized agency relationships of fiduciary law.58  Since benefi-
ciaries traditionally entered into relationships with fiduciaries to ac-
complish their own goals, they outlined the basic details of the
relationship.  Now, however, fiduciaries do more than decide how to
accomplish the tasks set forth by the beneficiaries—they design the
parameters of the relationships themselves.
In addition to the general risk to all beneficiaries where a fiduciary
has greatly increased power, there is also a risk to beneficiaries that
the fiduciary will prefer the interests of some beneficiaries over
others.  The fiduciary has many different principals to respond to—
and it is often an impossible task to give all the beneficiaries, who will
often have conflicting goals and desired strategies, what they want.
As a result, under trust law, fiduciaries have a duty of impartiality
when dealing with various beneficiaries of a pool of assets managed by
the fiduciary.59  This duty falls within the duty of loyalty discussed
An increase in private power comes at the expense of public control, and Congress
ceded significant control over health insurance to private actors.  The excesses of
private fiduciary power in a time of limited regulation, as we have seen recently,
frequently result in increased government control in response. See FRANKEL,
supra note 10, at 285.  For example, the well-known corporate governance fail-
ures in the Enron scandal resulted in the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in
2002.  Therefore, the pendulum may swing back in the future, and Congress can
retake some of the power over social welfare benefits. See id. at 286.
57. See Frankel, supra note 49, at 1253–54 (“Even if public fiduciaries are expected to
act as agents, they cannot be subject to the control or unlimited power of removal
by their principals.”).
58. Id.
59. Although the duty of impartiality traditionally referred to the fiduciary’s duty to
consider both life and remainder interests in trust property, see John H.
Langbein, Why Did Trust Law Become Statute Law in the United States?, 58 ALA.
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above.60  At its most basic level, any payment from the pool of assets
harms the interest of the other beneficiaries by reducing the pool of
assets, and the fiduciary must decide who has the right to payment in
different circumstances.61
Building on Frankel’s argument that a fiduciary to a large number
of beneficiaries has more power and takes on a public role and the
traditional duty of impartiality, I argue that there is a need for a new
framework that distinguishes the responsibilities of fiduciaries based
on the number of beneficiaries they serve.  The modern, institutional
nature of fiduciaries in these mass beneficiary relationships and the
resulting distance between fiduciary and beneficiary only heightens
the need for a new framework that ensures collective accountability to
all beneficiaries (and to the public since the services of the fiduciary
are subsidized by tax exclusions and deductions).
III. THE FAILURE TO HOLD THE EXPANDING FIDUCIARY
ACCOUNTABLE UNDER ERISA
ERISA formalized nearly a century of public-private relationships
by systematically regulating pension promises made by employers to
employees for the first time.62  ERISA was designed to protect work-
ers from the insecurities of a private pension system while simultane-
ously encouraging the growth of that private system.63  After all,
protecting employee expectations of receiving pensions would be
L. REV. 1069, 1075 (2007), the duty is equally applicable for trusts that manage
assets owned by large numbers of beneficiaries. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS
§ 79 (2003) (“A trustee has a duty to administer the trust in a manner that is
impartial with respect to the various beneficiaries of the trust . . . .”).
60. DeMott, supra note 26, at 1054; Daniel Fischel & John H. Langbein, ERISA’s
Fundamental Contradiction: The Exclusive Benefit Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1105,
1109 (1988).  ERISA ignores impartiality and instead emphasizes that fiduciaries
must act in the best interest of participants—implicitly assuming that those par-
ticipants share common interests.  The Revenue Act of 1921 first introduced the
exclusive benefit rule, or the idea that an employer creating a pension plan had to
set up a trust for the exclusive benefit of employees, into the American private
pension system.  ERISA continues this same rule. Id. at 1109.  Fischel and
Langbein, however, show that it is foolish to assume all pension plan partici-
pants, for example, have common interests.  They detail typical conflicts, such as
that between older and younger workers over the extent to which employers
should provide compensation in the form of pension benefits at all and the con-
flict between active employees and retirees.  ERISA’s exclusive benefit rule does
not sufficiently explain how to balance these competing interests, and over a dec-
ade after the passage of ERISA, Fischel and Langbein argued for the incorpora-
tion of the trust law duty of impartiality into pension law. Id. at 1120–21,
1159–60.
61. Fischel & Langbein, supra note 60, at 1128–29.
62. JENNIFER KLEIN, FOR ALL THESE RIGHTS: BUSINESS, LABOR, AND THE SHAPING OF
AMERICA’S PUBLIC-PRIVATE WELFARE STATE (2003); Stevens, supra note 6.
63. HACKER, supra note 6.
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meaningless if employers stopped offering pension plans because of
onerous regulations.64
What many outside the field do not know is that ERISA also gov-
erns group health plans.  While including little in the statute specific
to health plans, Congress included a broad preemption clause within
ERISA that made state insurance laws inapplicable to ERISA plans.
More and more employers now self-insure to fall within ERISA’s
favorable boundaries.65
Every day, ERISA fiduciaries make decisions about whether to
grant one participant’s claim for benefits or change one rule about how
one benefit plan will be administered.  ERISA sanctions their right to
make these decisions.  In the aggregate, these decisions make policy.
The issue that remains many decades later is accountability—who de-
termines whether these private actors are behaving as desired; how
compliance is measured, meaning what the standards are to which
they are supposed to adhere and how deviation is determined; and
what the consequences are if the private actors fail to behave as de-
sired.  In this Part, I show that the application of these accountability
principles to ERISA does not result in sufficient accountability to the
many participants and beneficiaries in ERISA plans and therefore re-
quires a new framework.
A. Holding Private Actors Accountable: The Role of
Congress
If bureaucratic structure and oversight is heavily debated when
Congress delegates to government actors, then structuring delega-
tions to private actors deserves at least as much attention.66  My goal
here is not to debate the wisdom of delegation in general or in the case
of ERISA specifically,67 but instead to focus on the importance of legis-
64. “Based on the sheer number of lives touched, the passage of ERISA is arguably
the third ‘big bang’ of the American welfare state” after Social Security and Medi-
care/Medicaid. HOWARD, supra note 6, at 77.  By 1974, nearly 31 million Ameri-
cans were covered by a private pension plan, and today, roughly one-half of
private workers participate in an employer-sponsored retirement plan.  Irena
Dushi & Howard M. Iams, Pension Plan Participation Among Married Couples,
73 SOC. SEC. BULL. 45, 45–52 (2013); JOHN W. THOMPSON, BUREAU OF LAB. STAT.,
DEFINED BENEFIT PLANS AT THE DAWN OF ERISA 1 (Mar. 30, 2005), archived at
http://perma.unl.edu/BQC5-9R7C.
65. See infra section II.C.
66. In this section, I discuss congressional delegation to private fiduciaries and not
the agency relationship between fiduciaries and beneficiaries.  The parallels of
the two agency relationships are clear, however.
67. See generally THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC
OF THE UNITED STATES (1979).
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lative and judicial tools to control private fiduciaries used by Congress
to achieve public goals.68
Delegation involves risks:
The opportunism that generates agency losses is a ubiquitous feature of the
human experience.  It crops up whenever workers are hired, committees are
appointed, property is rented, or money is loaned.  The message that we are
all feckless agents of a Divine Principal is at the very heart of Judeo-Christian
theology.69
In addition to outright theft or self-dealing, delegation can result in
shirking and slippage.  While an agent pays the cost for hard work in
time (if not money), the reward goes mainly to the principal.  An agent
may therefore “shirk”—or exert less effort—to complete the delegated
task, resulting in slippage—or the gap between what the principal
wants done and how the agent completes the task.  Because monitor-
ing involves costs, a principal must weigh the benefits of monitoring
(reduced shirking and slippage) against these costs.70  Some amount
of slippage is inevitable at each point of delegation and oversight (e.g.,
when citizens delegate to government, when the legislature delegates
to the bureaucracy or private actors, or when the courts or Congress
hold hearings regarding complaints about the agent’s behavior).71
Government faces the same basic principal-agent problem when
delegating to private actors.  But government delegation to private ac-
tors instead of the bureaucracy presents unique difficulties for policy
implementation.72  Beyond the classic notion that firms are motivated
by maximizing profits making it difficult to align their goals with
those of Congress, the voluntary nature of the relationship between
principal and agent in this case affects Congress’s ability to control its
agents.73  The literature is now moving toward an exploration of how
Congress can control private actors (or at least hold them accountable)
68. See Terry M. Moe, The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure, in CAN THE GOVERN-
MENT GOVERN? 267 (John Chubb & Paul Peterson eds., 1989).
69. D. RODERICK KIEWIET & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, THE LOGIC OF DELEGATION:
CONGRESSIONAL PARTIES AND THE APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS 5 (1991).
70. Terry M. Moe, The New Economics of Organization, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 739,
750–51 (1984).
71. Terry M. Moe, Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story, 6 J.L. ECON.
& ORG. 213, 231 (1990).
72. See Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367,
1462 (2003) (“A central characteristic of much government privatization is that
private delegates are granted powers not simply for their own advantage, but
rather to enable them to act—and more specifically, to interact with third par-
ties—on the government’s behalf.”).  These private actors have additional power
based on the importance of the services they provide and the imprimatur of the
government. Id. at 1463–64.
73. Jessica F. Green, Presentation at the Viterbo III Seminar on Global Administra-
tive Law, Delegation to Private Actors: A Study of the Clean Development Mech-
anism (June 15–16, 2007).
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when it decides to delegate to them.  Accountability is “the most diffi-
cult issue when governance is provided by private actors.”74
The first step when exploring a method of holding private actors
with delegated powers accountable is to define accountability.  Jerry
Mashaw supplies a framework:
[W]e should be able to specify at least six important things: who is liable or
accountable to whom; what they are liable to be called to account for; through
what processes accountability is to be assured; by what standards the puta-
tively accountable behavior is to be judged; and, what the potential effects are
of finding that those standards have been breached.75
I provide Mashaw’s framework here because it is both general enough
to apply to all delegations to private actors and comprehensive enough
to evaluate existing and proposed fiduciary regimes used as accounta-
bility mechanisms (including under ERISA).
When the policy space is very complex, as with health insurance
regulation, grants of power are necessarily broad and provide private
actors with great discretion.  “Certain public problems . . . lend them-
selves to neither specific behavioral commands nor measurable out-
comes.”76  Congress typically sacrifices control to realize the benefits
of bureaucratic expertise, and the same may be said for delegation to
private actors.  Facing a lack of access to information possessed by pri-
vate actors, this delegation is at times an expedient and necessary
strategy.  Congress has used the strategy of delegation in areas of
complex legislation and difficult political compromise for many years.
In fact, leaving significant discretion to the private sector instead of
burdening it with cumbersome regulation is frequently part of the po-
litical compromise.
The common law has been handling complex delegation issues
under the classic principal-agent scenario for many years.  Fiduciary
law addresses the problems that arise when an agent enters into a
fiduciary relationship with a principal—when the relationship trig-
gers a higher level of protection because of the special vulnerability of
the principal in the relationship.  A conflict of interest exists here be-
cause the agent is tasked with ignoring his own interests in favor of
those of another.77  It is necessary to address, then, whether common
74. Walter Mattli & Tim Bu¨the, Global Private Governance: Lessons from a National
Model of Setting Standards in Accounting, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 225, 227
(2005) (internal quotation marks omitted).
75. Jerry L. Mashaw, Accountability and Institutional Design: Some Thoughts on the
Grammar of Governance, in PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY: DESIGNS, DILEMMAS AND EX-
PERIENCES 115, 118 (Michael W. Dowdle ed., 2006); see Jody Freeman & Martha
Minow, Introduction: Reframing the Outsourcing Debates, in GOVERNMENT BY
CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 1 (Jody Freeman & Martha
Minow eds., 2009).
76. Kenneth. A. Bamberger, Regulation as Delegation: Private Firms, Decisionmak-
ing, and Accountability in the Administrative State, 56 DUKE L.J. 377, 389 (2006).
77. Metzger, supra note 72, at 1463.
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law or codified fiduciary standards are a sufficient means of holding
private actors accountable.78
Regardless of whether fiduciary standards have ensured sufficient
accountability in the ERISA context—and I find that they have not—I
argue that the ACA has created a new opportunity to increase ac-
countability under ERISA as it continues to expand the fiduciary role
in health insurance and healthcare.  I address Congress’ role because
its passage of ERISA is the foundation of the issues I discuss below
regarding whether each of the solutions I propose require further con-
gressional action, and if so, what action.
B. Expanding the Definition of “Fiduciary”
The main accomplishment of ERISA’s fiduciary provisions is that it
expands the number and types of people and institutions defined as
fiduciaries and subject to the strictures of fiduciary duties.  ERISA re-
quires every covered plan to “provide for one or more named fiducia-
ries who jointly or severally shall have authority to control and
manage the operation and administration of the plan.”79  In addition,
ERISA states:
[A] person is a fiduciary with respect to a plan to the extent (i) he exercises
any discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting management
of such plan or exercises any authority or control respecting management or
disposition of its assets, (ii) he renders investment advice for a fee or other
compensation, direct or indirect, with respect to any moneys or other property
of such plan, or has any authority or responsibility to do so, or (iii) he has any
discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in the administration of
such plan.80
78. ERISA is an example where Congress delegated substantial authority to private
actors in a complex policy space and utilized fiduciary standards developed by
courts under the common law to hold actors accountable.  It is not the only exam-
ple where fiduciary standards are used to hold private actors accountable.  For
example, the foster care system holds foster parents accountable for meeting
their fiduciary duties under state common law.  ERISA, however, has the benefit
of greater transparency for research purposes since it was a significant federal
statute where common law fiduciary standards were codified (showing intent to
use fiduciary duties as part of an accountability regime) and copious legislative
history exists.  There are also several decades of evidence showing the effects of
ERISA’s design, including federal case law.
79. ERISA § 402(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) (2012).  The main difference between
the House and Senate bills on fiduciary standards related to the definition of
“fiduciary.”  The House definition included not only those who managed plan as-
sets but also anyone who had discretionary authority over plan administration.
The conference committee staffers recommended the broader House definition,
and the conferees agreed on June 18, 1974. See JAMES A. WOOTEN, THE EM-
PLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974: A POLITICAL HISTORY 257–58
(2005).
80. ERISA § 3(21)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (2012).  ERISA’s test of who is a fiduci-
ary is a “functional” one—the work done for a plan by the person determines
whether he or she is a fiduciary rather than the title or lack of title assigned to
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Fiduciaries are subject to ERISA’s fiduciary duties, which provide
that:
[A] fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the
interest of the participants and beneficiaries and—(A) for the exclusive pur-
pose of: (i) providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries; and (ii)
defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan; (B) with the care,
skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a
prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would
use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims; (C)
by diversifying the investments of the plan so as to minimize the risk of large
losses, unless under the circumstances it is clearly prudent not to do so; and
(D) in accordance with the documents and instruments governing the
plan . . . .81
ERISA’s broad definition of fiduciary allows for the “fractionalization
of trusteeship.”82  While the commonly accepted definition of “trustee”
is “the person holding property in trust,” reflecting the notion of one
person or entity managing the trust, ERISA’s more complex definition
allows management of the trust to be dispersed to numerous individu-
als and entities, recognizing that today the administration of benefit
plans is typically split among and within institutions.  With the vast
sums of money involved in large pension and health plans, they fre-
quently outsource management to: the actuaries, consultants, or in-
surance companies who design the plan; several financial services
companies who manage the investment of plan funds; a bank who
safeguards the funds; third-party administrators who decide claims
and make payments; and lawyers, accountants, and actuaries who
handle other daily administrative needs of the plan.83
the party.  An example given by the Department of Labor is illustrative.  A plan
may employ a person as a “benefit supervisor.”  If that benefit supervisor only
calculates how large of a benefit to pay a participant based on the formulas set
forth in plan documents and a superior has final authorization to confirm the
benefit, then the benefit supervisor is not a fiduciary.  If the person with the title
“benefit supervisor” instead has final approval to determine the benefit amount
of a participant when there is a disagreement as to how much the participant is
entitled to under the plan documents, then the person is a fiduciary.  29 C.F.R.
§ 2509.75–8, D–3 Q (2008); see Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 262
(1993) (“ERISA, however, defines ‘fiduciary’ not in terms of formal trusteeship,
but in functional terms of control and authority over the plan.”).  Persons who
merely perform administrative functions for the pension plan and have no discre-
tion regarding management of the plan are not fiduciaries.  29
C.F.R. § 2509.75–8, D–2 Q (“[A] person who performs purely ministerial functions
such as the types described above for an employee benefit plan [which include
determining eligibility to participate in the plan, calculating benefits, and mak-
ing recommendations to others regarding plan administration] within a frame-
work of policies, interpretations, rules, practices and procedures made by other
persons is not a fiduciary . . . .”).
81. ERISA § 404(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (1974).
82. JOHN H. LANGBEIN, SUSAN STABILE & BRUCE WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BEN-
EFITS LAW 516 (4th ed. 2006).
83. Id. at 516–17.
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To enforce ERISA’s fiduciary provisions, Congress authorized both
criminal and civil penalties.  The statute provides for civil action by
plan participants and beneficiaries or the Secretary of Labor.84  This
private litigation remedy is designed to protect beneficiaries’ rights
through a review of fiduciary actions in the federal courts.
The most basic question to address when discussing ERISA’s ex-
pansive fiduciary rules is why they were enacted at all.  Stricter mini-
mum vesting standards (i.e., rules regarding the time it takes for
pension participants to qualify irrevocably for their benefits and not
risk forfeiting those benefits upon job loss) and funding standards for
pensions were needed because they did not previously exist—the gov-
ernment had allowed employers and employees to make their own
pension bargains without setting any minimum terms.  Judges had
used states’ common law of trusts, however, to enforce fiduciary obli-
gations against trustees for many years.  ERISA required that all
plans be in the form of trusts but need not have preempted state trust
law’s application to benefit plans.  So why was codification of the fidu-
ciary rules necessary at all?85  And how, if at all, did ERISA change
those fiduciary rules based in trust law?86
84. ERISA creates a private right of action as follows:
A civil action may be brought (1) by a participant or beneficiary . . . (B) to
recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his
rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future bene-
fits under the terms of the plan . . . (3) by a participant, beneficiary, or
fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of
this subchapter or the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropri-
ate equitable relief (i) to redress such violation or (ii) to enforce any pro-
visions of this subchapter or the terms of the plan.
ERISA § 502(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (2014).
85. There has long been a debate among legal scholars regarding whether the com-
mon law should be codified in all areas of the law. See Mark D. Rosen, What Has
Happened to the Common Law?—Recent American Codifications, and Their Im-
pact on Judicial Practice and the Law’s Subsequent Development, 1994 WIS. L.
REV. 1119, 1127 (“Codification refers to the legislative pronouncement of previ-
ously fluid judge-made law in an organized and authoritative form.”).  Although
the debate was at its height from the 1830s to the early 1900s, with those against
codification carrying the day, significant codification occurred starting in the
middle of the twentieth century. See id.; see also Gunther A. Weiss, The Enchant-
ment of Codification in the Common-Law World, 25 YALE J. INT’L L. 435 (2000)
(exploring how codification affects common law systems).  Opponents of codifica-
tion have traditionally argued that the common law adds needed “flexibility” that
allows the law to adapt to changing facts and times, while proponents assert that
unelected judges should not be making law.  Rosen, supra note 85, at 1122–23.
86. Congress incorporated fiduciary standards from trust law into ERISA, which is
why agencies and courts look to trust law for answers when ERISA is silent or
ambiguous.  John H. Langbein, The Secret Life of the Trust: The Trust as an In-
strument of Commerce, 107 YALE L.J. 165, 168 (1997); see Varity Corp. v. Howe,
516 U.S. 489, 496 (1996) (“In doing so, we recognize that these fiduciary duties
draw much of their content from the common law of trusts, the law that governed
most benefit plans before ERISA’s enactment.” (citations omitted)); Firestone
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In answer to the first question, codification was necessary because
trust law was originally designed to respond to interfamilial gifts to a
small number of people managed by neutral trustees.  Codification
was therefore necessary not to set in place an entirely new legal re-
gime, but instead to adapt trust law to the employee benefit context.87
In answer to the second question, ERISA expanded the fiduciary du-
ties of trust law and made them mandatory for a larger number of
people and institutions involved in the administration of a pension
plan—refusing to let fiduciaries opt out of the expansive new duties
for plan administrators.88  Codification of common law fiduciary du-
ties and attempted adaptation to the institutional fiduciary/mass ben-
eficiary context was the first step towards a collective framework of
accountability—and Congress was willing to take it.
ERISA codified the duties of loyalty and prudence from trust law
but otherwise did not write existing trust law into the statute whole-
sale.89  Instead, Congress intentionally relied on the courts to look to
trust law to fill in its “skeletal” outline and adapt trust law to the
Tire & Rubber v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110 (1989) (“ERISA’s legislative history
confirms that the Act’s fiduciary responsibility provisions ‘codif[y] and mak[e] ap-
plicable to [ERISA] fiduciaries certain principles developed in the evolution of the
law of trusts.’  Given this language and history, we have held that courts are to
develop a ‘federal common law of rights and obligations under ERISA-regulated
plans.’” (citations omitted)).
87. ERISA architect Senator Jacob Javits noted that trust law developed to deal with
relationships involving a small number of beneficiaries and argued that “there is
a very serious problem arising from the fact that at common law the definition of
‘trustee’ is quite narrow in scope, while in pension and welfare trust administra-
tion, the number of persons who handle and exercise control of the funds is much
broader.”  Javits stated that at common law:
These trusts usually involve but a single settler and, at most, a rela-
tively small, well defined class of beneficiaries . . . . Clearly, this body of
traditional trust law, vast as it is, must be applied quite differently to
employee benefit plans which are the product of collective bargaining
and may cover thousands of employees of many different employers.
S. 3589–Introduction to Employee Benefits Protection Act–Administration Bill to
Amend the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act, 91st Cong., Cong. Rec.
7278–79 (Mar. 13, 1970) [hereinafter S. 3589].
88. Senator Jacob Javits stated that trust law permitted exculpatory clauses that
helped fiduciaries avoid responsibility for breaching their duties, and this did not
provide the security needed for pension plan participants. Id. at 7285–86.  Ignor-
ing the likelihood that savvy trustees could take advantage of those creating
trusts, trust law historically permitted exculpatory clauses in trust formation
documents that exempted trustees from liability for anything other than egre-
gious conduct.  Collins v. Storer Broad. Co., 120 S.E.2d 764, 769 (Ga. 1961).
89. John H. Langbein, What ERISA Means by “Equitable”: The Supreme Court’s
Trail of Error in Russell, Mertens, and Great West, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1317,
1319 (2003) (arguing that “the reach of trust-law principles in ERISA is far
deeper and more controlling” than the courts often recognize but that ERISA
adapted trust law to the employee benefit context).
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employee benefits context.90  Unable to compromise on thorny politi-
cal issues, Congress punted to the courts to make resolving these is-
sues unnecessary.  Refusing to spell out each detail of the legal
framework that would govern employee benefit plans also gave Con-
gress flexibility when regulating a complex field that few understood
and whose response to such regulations fewer could predict.91  Adopt-
ing much of the trust-law framework saved Congress the time of hav-
ing to generate and agree on a new regime while also providing the
legitimacy associated with a well-established body of law.92
Changes to existing trust law were necessary to solve a few
problems with the strict application of trust law to employee benefit
plans and expand the definition of fiduciary.93  A tougher problem
with the application of state trust law to large-scale benefit plans was
the conflict of interest between employers and employees, plan spon-
sors and participants.  Although all fiduciary relationships involve
some conflict of interest because a fiduciary must act for the interests
of beneficiaries even where they directly oppose the fiduciary’s inter-
ests, the fiduciary typically has not contributed any of the assets in
the trust from his own pocket, nor is he paying to administer the trust.
This is the issue that makes Congress’s delegation risky and—accord-
ing to some—requires that the government administer all pension and
health funds.  Congress decided that alterations to common law fiduci-
ary protections at the time of codification could reduce the risk suffi-
ciently to make delegation to these conflicted fiduciaries advisable,
particularly since Congress had to balance the need to protect benefi-
ciaries already participating in pension plans with the goal of encour-
aging the maintenance and growth of private pensions by
employers.94
90. Id. at 1325–26.
91. Id. at 1329.
92. Id. at 1328.
93. See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 496–97 (1996) (“We also recognize, how-
ever, that trust law does not tell the entire story.  After all, ERISA’s standards
and procedural protections partly reflect a congressional determination that the
common law of trusts did not offer completely satisfactory protec-
tion. . . . Consequently, we believe that the law of trusts often will inform, but will
not necessarily determine the outcome of, an effort to interpret ERISA’s fiduciary
duties.  In some instances, trust law will offer only a starting point, after which
courts must go on to ask whether, or to what extent, the language of the statute,
its structure, or its purposes require departing from common-law trust require-
ments.  And, in doing so, courts may have to take account of competing congres-
sional purposes, such as Congress’ desire to offer employees enhanced protection
for their benefits, on the one hand, and, on the other, its desire not to create a
system that is so complex that administrative costs, or litigation expenses, un-
duly discourage employers from offering welfare benefit plans in the first place.”
(citations omitted)).
94. ERISA’s drafters sought to prevent fiduciary disloyalty and poor management
because pension plan sponsors frequently created and administered plans for
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ERISA departs from trust law by allowing executives of the em-
ployer to serve as fiduciaries, even though trustees were traditionally
professionals without any inherent conflicts of interest and employer
representatives face inherent conflicts.95  The plan may also be ad-
ministered by one or more third parties hired by the employer to run
the plan, resulting in another conflict of interest: a third party has an
interest in pleasing the plan sponsor in order to retain the contract to
administer the plan, but less interest in pleasing the participants who
have no say in the selection of the plan administrator.96  Congress rec-
ognized that allowing the plan sponsor to retain control over plan ad-
ministration was necessary to encourage plan formation by helping an
employer keep costs down through its hiring or retention of lower-cost
parties to help administer the funds.
But Congress believed that mandatory fiduciary obligations would
prevent employers from acting in their own interest and force them
all—everyone involved in running the pension plans—to act in the in-
terests of plan participants.
ERISA’s fiduciary regime, which governs benefit denial cases, is also pro-
foundly paternalistic.  Precisely because ERISA subjects every employee bene-
fit plan to ERISA’s duties of loyalty, prudent administration, and “full and
fair” internal review of benefit denials, we can be certain that Congress pre-
ferred these protective principles of ERISA fiduciary law [to freedom of
contract].97
their own benefit instead of participants’.  Employers created benefit plans to
shelter money from taxes or to invest in employer securities.  Sponsors rarely had
rank-and-file employees’ well-being as their sole focus.  Sponsors traditionally
had the ability to control plan documents and make investments that served
their business interests.  For example, they could amend plans at any time to cut
or eliminate benefits, and they frequently invested pension funds in real estate
the company wanted to purchase or in loans to the company that carried low
interest rates.  Since sponsors were not required to disclose the plan’s invest-
ments, forcing disclosure of “prohibited transactions” required timely and costly
litigation by plan participants who were often uninformed and certainly less pow-
erful than those running the plans. See SASS, supra note 45, at 205–07.
95. John H. Langbein, Trust Law as Regulatory Law: The Unum/Provident Scandal
and Judicial Review of Benefit Denials Under ERISA, 101 Nw. U. L. REV. 1315,
1326–27 (2007); see also ERISA § 408(c)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1108(c)(3) (2012) (“Noth-
ing in section 1106 of this title shall be construed to prohibit any fiduciary
from . . . (3) serving as a fiduciary in addition to being an officer, employee, agent,
or other representative of a party in interest.”).
96. Langbein, supra note 95, at 1326.
97. Id. at 1329–30.  Langbein takes issue with cases decided by Judge Posner that
fail to acknowledge the inherent conflict of interest held by most ERISA plan
administrators and instead argue that the relationship between administrator
and participants is similar to that of any contractual parties standing on opposite
sides of the table.  Instead, Langbein asserts that ERISA’s fiduciary protections
do not permit the type of self-interested behavior allowed among contractual par-
ties and instead protect participants from the clear conflict of interest of plan
administrators who work directly or indirectly for the plan sponsor. Id.
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Congress thus explicitly incorporated fiduciary standards into ERISA
to hold those who administer private employee benefit plans accounta-
ble, but it did so under a framework focused on the individual rights of
participants and beneficiaries under the terms of a particular benefit
plan.  There was no mention of a universal right to pensions or health
insurance or consistent treatment of workers across employers.
C. A Failure of Legal Accountability
As has been amply covered by scholars previously, efforts to force
accountability under ERISA’s provisions have been stymied by the
courts to a large extent.98  Courts have inappropriately compared pri-
vate fiduciaries facing a clear conflict of interest between providing
benefits and containing costs for employers and insurance companies
to government bureaucrats making decisions about whether to grant
social welfare benefits.  The result has been lax review of fiduciary
decision-making under an arbitrary and capricious standard of review
and nearly unbridled discretion for these powerful figures in our pub-
lic-private social welfare system.  As Brendan Maher wrote:
ERISA’s remedial system exemplifies the preference of many litigation re-
formers.  It is a (1) mandatory, (2) no-damages, (3) private scheme of dispute
resolution, subject only to (4) modest agency regulation, (5) feeble judicial
oversight, and (6) no juries. . . . The irony is that ERISA, at the time of its
passage, was hailed as a landmark protective statute.99
Prior to the passage of ERISA, courts first treated pensions as gra-
tuities granted by generous employers—not money that workers had
earned through deferred wages for long years of service.100  Even as
courts came to accept a theory of pension promises to employees as
contracts, employees had a difficult time claiming their benefits.101
98. See, e.g., James A. Wooten, A Reflection on ERISA Claims Administration and
the Exhaustion Requirement, 6 DREXEL L. REV. 573, 575–76 (2014) (“In the sphere
of claims administration, however, the governing rules—including the exhaus-
tion requirement, deferential judicial review of claims denials, and the limitation
of judicial review to the record developed as part of the plan’s claims process—
create a regime that leaves participants and beneficiaries extremely vulnera-
ble. . . . Here, then, is a set of rules that seems very ill adapted to the expectations
and capacities of the people benefit plans exist to serve.”); Jay Conison, Suits for
Benefits Under ERISA, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 16 (1992) (discussing how legisla-
tive history shows Congress preempted state laws on benefit claims that were too
strict and did not permit equitable remedies).
99. See Brendan S. Maher, The Affordable Care Act, Remedy, and Litigation Reform,
63 AM. U. L. REV. 649, 661–62 (2014) (discussing how instead of meeting ERISA’s
goal of easy access to courts and broad remedies, the courts limited remedies and
preemption left no other avenue for plan participants).
100. See Roth, supra note 46, at 221–25 (“Beginning in the late nineteenth century
and lasting until the middle of the twentieth century, courts viewed pensions as
gratuities (i.e., gifts) to be altered or withdrawn freely by employers.”).
101. Id. at 225–33 (“Most judges believed that they had no choice but to favor employ-
ers and strictly construe the terms of the pension plans that they drafted.”).
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This historical view of pensions influenced ERISA common law in
spite of congressional goals.
After ERISA, the federal courts charged with helping to hold fidu-
ciaries accountable largely abdicated that role.  They created a defer-
ential standard of review for fiduciary decisions on benefit claims—
overturning only arbitrary and capricious decisions instead of ensur-
ing that claims were decided correctly.  This allowed private actors the
same discretion typically accorded to an agency decision maker.102
Courts also required that claimants exhaust a benefit plan’s inter-
nal review procedures before pursuing their claims in court, although
legislative history indicates that Congress wanted to create multiple
avenues for claimants to seek redress and not erect additional barriers
to relief.103  Extra grievance procedures seem, therefore, not to have
helped claimants successfully pursue their benefits but instead have
kept claimants from meaningful review of their claims.
Yet few outside the discipline realize how dramatically the courts
altered our healthcare landscape under ERISA as well.104  This leni-
ent standard of review applies to health plans subject to ERISA’s
strictures, and employers largely self-insure to gain access to this def-
erential standard of review through ERISA’s preemption clause.105
102. Id. at 257–62 (discussing Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101
(1989), and its progeny).
103. Id. at 262–66 (“The current law pays little attention to ERISA’s central purpose
of safeguarding benefit expectations.  Indeed, it often seems perversely designed
to thwart benefit expectations, for no better reason than judicial force of habit.”
(quoting Conison, supra note 98, at 3)). But see Wooten, supra note 98, at 578–79
(discussing how former congressional staffers who helped draft ERISA, Bob Na-
gle and Frank Cummings, explained at a recent conference that they “had in
mind an exhaustion requirement” at the time of the statute’s passage because of
similar procedures used in labor law at the time).
104. See Maher, supra note 99, at 653 (explaining that ERISA’s remedies for benefit
claims were far more restrictive than those available under state law likely be-
cause of “legal realism” since “[j]udicial extra-statutory concerns about the cost of
health care, the lack of a suitable alternative to employment-based health insur-
ance, and a profound skepticism toward the utility of remedy in general were
significant, if not dominant, variables in reading ERISA as the judiciary has
done”).
105. ERISA’s preemption clause allowed employers to avoid state regulation of health-
care and deny benefits to an increasing number of participants. WOOTEN, supra
note 79, at 281.  The clause declares that ERISA “supersede[s] any and all State
laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan”
with an exception for any law that “regulates insurance, banking, or securities.”
29 U.S.C. § 1144(a), (b)(2)(A) (2012).  The “deemer clause” then prevents the ap-
plication of these state insurance, banking, and securities laws to employee bene-
fit plans.  In the case of health plans, the deemer clause provides that an
employee benefit plan will not be “deemed to be an insurance company or other
insurer . . . or to be engaged in the business of insurance” for the purpose of state
insurance laws.  29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B); see WOOTEN, supra note 79, at 281.
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Under ERISA, Congress sought to ensure that employees’ expecta-
tions would be met and their rights secured.
Many additional employers turned to self-insurance as healthcare
costs rose in the 1980s in order to fall under ERISA’s preemption
clause and lax standard of review for review of benefit determinations.
The use of utilization review by third-party administrators (and
through these third parties, employers) brought insurers into the doc-
tor-patient relationship and determinations of appropriate healthcare
treatments.  The plans increasingly required pre-approval of costly
tests and procedures.  Self-insured employers did not increase their
liability significantly because they used “stop-loss” policies to hedge
against liability from benefit claims that exceeded a particular dollar
threshold.106
Employers increasingly denied benefit claims through utilization
review, while plan participants faced an uphill battle when appealing
denials in court.  At worst, the plan would have to pay the claim and
attorney’s fees after a lawsuit because courts also interpreted ERISA’s
remedies narrowly.107  Scandals over bad faith denials of benefit
claims were exposed slowly and called into question the involvement
of ERISA fiduciaries in healthcare decisions.108
In Pegram v. Herdich,109 the Supreme Court held that treatment
decisions made by physicians employed by Health Maintenance Orga-
nizations (HMOs) are not even fiduciary acts under ERISA.  Since
HMOs are designed to contain health expenses by rationing medical
care, the Court found that a provision giving physicians a financial
incentive to deny treatment was not a fiduciary act.110  While Herdich
does not point to any particular treatment decision and thus argues
purely that the conflict of interest inherent in the plan design is a
violation of ERISA’s fiduciary duties (an argument unlikely to succeed
since ERISA fiduciaries commonly operate under a financial conflict of
interest), the Court shows great deference to plan administrators who
make “mixed eligibility and treatment decisions.”111
106. WOOTEN, supra note 79, at 281–83.
107. Id.
108. See Langbein, supra note 95, at 1317–21 (discussing the scandal over the Unum/
Provident Corporation’s long-term policy of denying valid disability benefit
claims to increase profits).
109. 530 U.S. 211 (2000).
110. Id. at 221 (“Since inducement to ration care goes to the very point of any HMO
scheme, and rationing necessarily raises some risks while reducing others (rup-
tured appendixes are more likely; unnecessary appendectomies are less so), any
legal principle purporting to draw a line between good and bad HMOs would em-
body, in effect, a judgment about socially acceptable medical risk.”).
111. Id. at 226; see id. at 229 (“The eligibility decision and the treatment decision were
inextricably mixed, as they are in countless medical administrative decisions
every day.”).
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I argue in this Article that the courts went astray in their review of
fiduciary decisions under ERISA because they ignored changes in the
fiduciary role as individual fiduciaries became institutional fiduciaries
and individual beneficiaries became large numbers of beneficiaries.
Basing decisions on traditional trust law as the relationship between
fiduciary and beneficiary grew more attenuated was even more dan-
gerous as the fiduciary relationship became less about property rights
and more about access to healthcare.
IV. HOW THE ACA CONTINUES TO EXPAND
THE FIDUCIARY ROLE
Although the ACA has generated dramatic controversy and many
claim that it has gone too far in advancing a right to health insurance,
any purported right to health insurance or healthcare is in its infancy.
Just as private pensions were first treated by the courts as mere gra-
tuities offered by generous employers, the provision of private health
insurance is subject to so many conditions and qualifications as to
make any “right” of little value without additional regulation.
Some scholars find that the ACA creates a statutory right to
healthcare—a right that may or may not be “durable” depending on
the implementation of the statute112—but they largely ignore the way
in which the implementation of another protective statute with re-
spect to social welfare benefits continues to dramatically restrict ac-
cess to healthcare.  The ACA does nothing to impede the discretion of
ERISA fiduciaries who act as gatekeepers to benefits provided under
many private group health insurance plans.  Increased access is only
meaningful if the role of fiduciaries as guardians of broad social wel-
fare rights is acknowledged and they are properly supervised in recog-
nition of their current conflicts of interest as representatives of
businesses that seek to limit those rights for financial gain.
A. A Right to Healthcare
The Supreme Court’s analysis of the ACA has all the hallmarks of
early jurisprudence on pension rights—a discussion of economics and
costs with little mention of engineering a larger societal safety net or
even protecting individuals.  In National Federation of Independent
112. Erin C. Fuse Brown, Developing a Durable Right to Health Care, 14 MINN. J.L.
SCI. & TECH. 439, 441 (2013) (arguing that only time will reveal whether the ACA
is a superstatute and the right to healthcare therefore durable or—more likely in
her view—a quasi-superstatute that struggles upon implementation); see Wendy
K. Mariner, Health Insurance Is Dead; Long Live Health Insurance, 40 AM. J.L. &
MED. 195, 214 (2014) (“The ACA is intended to provide near-universal health in-
surance coverage for the purpose of enabling Americans to obtain needed medical
care.  In this respect, health insurance performs a governance function by financ-
ing and distributing healthcare.”).
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Businesses v. Sebelius (NFIB),113 the debate surrounding the ACA is
framed as one regarding constitutionally acceptable methods of en-
couraging increased participation in our public-private health insur-
ance system—not of a universal right to healthcare or even to health
insurance.114  In fact, while Congress dramatically increased the
number of individuals eligible for affordable health insurance,115
many are excluded from the new opportunities for health insurance
provided by the statute—including prisoners and illegal immi-
grants.116  Others will choose to pay the tax penalty rather than
purchase insurance.117  Thus, if a right exists, it is only meant to be
enjoyed by large segments of society and is not a universal right, ac-
cording to both Congress and the Supreme Court.
Chief Justice Roberts argues instead that the policy issue under
the ACA’s individual mandate is one of cost shifting since hospitals
are required to pay for the care of the uninsured and then pass the
costs onto insurance companies and from there to covered individuals
through insurance premiums.118  In her concurrence, however, Justice
Ginsburg recognizes that the uninsured are typically denied impor-
113. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
114. Id. at 2580 (“The Act aims to increase the number of Americans covered by health
insurance and decrease the cost of health care.”); see Michael J. Graetz & Jerry L.
Mashaw, Constitutional Uncertainty and the Design of Social Insurance: Reflec-
tions on the Obamacare Case, 7 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 343 (2013) (“The ACA case,
then, is best understood as a legal attack on the means, but not the goals, of the
health care legislation, even though, as we shall show, by inhibiting potentially
achievable means for expanding social insurance, the Court may also have under-
mined the goals of expanding and modernizing our nation’s social-insurance pro-
tections.”); see also Mariner, supra note 112, at 201 (“The goal of making
healthcare available to all (or virtually all) could only be financed through mod-
ern health insurance methods.  Thus, the ACA cemented a broader social func-
tion for health insurance, employing it to serve the goal of access to affordable
healthcare for all.”).
115. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2585 (“In the Affordable Care Act, Congress addressed the
problem of those who cannot obtain insurance coverage because of preexisting
conditions or other health issues.  It did so through the Act’s ‘guaranteed-issue’
and ‘community-rating’ provisions.  These provisions together prohibit insurance
companies from denying coverage to those with such conditions or charging un-
healthy individuals higher premiums than healthy individuals.”).
116. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(d) (2010).
117. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2594, 2597 (noting the Congressional Budget Office estimated
that four million people per year will choose to pay the penalty and forego insur-
ance coverage, and that those who pay no income tax will not be subject to the
penalty).
118. Id. at 2585 (“Congress estimated that the cost of uncompensated care raises fam-
ily health insurance premiums, on average, by over $1,000 per year.”); see Mari-
ner, supra note 112, at 199 (arguing that “Americans treat healthcare like a
necessity and a public good” instead of a typical insurance product because of this
legal duty to treat patients in hospital emergency rooms).
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tant primary care.119  In this way, Ginsburg reminds us that the stat-
ute should be interpreted to help accomplish its broader social policy
goals.
The Court does its best to view the ACA as a technical statute that
makes modest changes to our present health insurance system instead
of a dramatic reengineering of social welfare benefits.  It seems to
warn Congress to exercise caution in this area.  In striking down the
requirement that states expand Medicaid to cover those earning 133%
of the poverty level or lose all Medicaid funding, Chief Justice Roberts
asserts that the provision “accomplishes a shift in kind, not merely
degree.”120  As he states, under the provision, Medicaid “is no longer a
program to care for the neediest among us, but rather an element of a
comprehensive national plan to provide universal health insurance
coverage.”121  Given that Congress can presumably enact such a na-
tional plan, though (and thought it had done so under the ACA), Jus-
tice Ginsburg in her concurrence questions whether “Congress must
take the repeal/reenact [Medicaid] route” instead of merely amending
the current statute.122  By forcing a repeal to change Medicaid in the
manner contemplated, Roberts prioritizes form over substance and
undermines a right to healthcare.
Regardless of the avoidance of any discussion by Congress or the
Supreme Court of a right to health insurance or healthcare, all agree
that the goal and impact of the ACA is to dramatically expand the
number of participants in the public and private health insurance sys-
tems.  The larger the population with health insurance, the more
likely that it will come to be viewed as a universal (or near universal
right).123  Wendy Mariner argues this point in her recent article and
states that under the ACA, health insurance is equivalent to social
119. Id. at 2611–12 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (“The failure of individuals to acquire
insurance has other deleterious effects on the health-care market.  Because those
without insurance generally lack access to preventative care, they do not receive
treatment for conditions—like hypertension and diabetes—that can be success-
fully and affordably treated if diagnosed early on.”); see Mariner, supra note 112,
at 200 (explaining that inclusion of preventive care in health insurance policies
separates them from other forms of insurance where indemnity from predictable
and regular expenses is not sought and would not be worth the cost because pre-
ventive health expenses help prevent larger future costs).
120. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2605–06 (majority opinion).
121. Id. at 2606.
122. Id. at 2629 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (“A ritualistic requirement that Congress
repeal and reenact spending legislation in order to enlarge the population served
by a federally funded program would advance no constitutional principle and
would scarcely serve the interests of federalism.”).
123. Mariner, supra note 112, at 202 (“As more people are able to obtain health insur-
ance, whether public or private, the idea of having health insurance becomes rou-
tine and expected.  Because insurance is a means of spreading costs, the
expectation of health insurance suggests that the cost of healthcare is a shared
responsibility—at least to the extent of the benefits it covers.”).
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insurance instead of a more typical insurance product.124  Almost all
Americans need healthcare, and almost all use it regularly.125  Ameri-
cans pay for the vast majority of their health expenses with direct pay-
ments from their health insurance companies to service providers,
using insurance to purchase a product instead of seek reimbursement
for loses.  In this way, private benefits function like public benefits.126
As Mariner states, “Intangible states of being, like going places and
getting well, are not products that can be bought.”127
Mariner argues that this has two primary repercussions for the
ACA.  The first is how the law regulating health insurance plans
needs to change.  She assumes that legislation and regulation will in-
crease and force health plans to comply with the new policy of near-
universal access, even at the expense of the insurers’ own goals.128
While a noble concept, this is simply not what happened in the after-
math of ERISA and there is no guarantee that the connection between
access to health insurance and ERISA plans will result in increased
regulation of ERISA-covered plans.
The other issue that using private insurance to meet the public
goal of near-universal access leaves for ACA implementation is what
benefits will be offered.129  As Mariner admits, however, “Given the
breadth of required coverage, the decisions most important to pa-
tients—exactly what treatment will and will not be paid for within the
general categories—remain with the insurer.”130  This is precisely the
reason that fiduciaries hold so much power over access to healthcare
and a new framework of accountability is needed that takes into ac-
count near-universal access and the resulting quasi-public nature of
all health insurance.
My question stands as to whether the expansion of insurance is
meaningful given the murky role of fiduciaries in a public-private sys-
tem of ever-increasing size.  As private actors stand guard over access
124. Id. at 195–96 (“Health insurance is now so integrated into the healthcare system
that we can no longer have one without the other.”).
125. Id. at 198 (noting that in 2009 only 1% of adults had never seen a healthcare
provider and 82.5% had done so within the previous year).
126. Id. at 197 (citing the fact Americans used public and private health insurance to
pay for 85.7% of health expenses to bolster this argument).
127. Id. at 198.
128. Id. at 204 (“[W]hen insurance is used to finance a goal like access to healthcare,
the insurance contract or ‘product’ itself must be designed to achieve that goal,
instead of other goals the insurer may prefer. . . . This means that legislation and
regulations will increasingly shape the boundaries of health insurance coverage
and pricing.”).
129. Id. at 206–09 (discussing the Essential Health Benefits required of health plans
under the ACA).
130. Id. at 209.
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to this right (whether present or future), the readiness of fiduciaries to
serve the collective and protect this right is in doubt.131
B. Fiduciary Gatekeepers for Healthcare
ERISA and its fiduciary mandates do not cover the health plans of
all employees with employer-sponsored health insurance.  Plans of-
fered to employees and their dependents by religious organizations
(church plans) and governments at all levels are excluded, as are gov-
ernment-run benefit plans such as Medicare and Medicaid.132  A 2006
survey by the U.S. Census Bureau found that 82%, or 132.8 million of
161.7 million Americans with employer-sponsored health plans were
participants or dependents in plans covered by ERISA.133  Roughly
55% of those in plans covered by ERISA are subject to self-insured
plans that are not covered by any state regulation as a result of ER-
ISA’s preemption clause.134
According to the Congressional Budget Office’s April 2014 projec-
tions, six million nonelderly Americans will have gained insurance
coverage through enrollment in the new federal and state exchanges
by the end of 2014 as a result of the ACA (with fewer than half a
million losing employment-based coverage).135  By 2016, the projec-
tions increase to twenty-four million gaining coverage through the ex-
changes while seven million lose employment-based coverage (most of
whom are presumably among those gaining coverage through the ex-
changes).136  Regardless of any official right to healthcare or lack
thereof, millions are gaining health insurance and, through this insur-
ance, access to preventive healthcare instead of having to rely on
emergency rooms.
Scholars conclude that the ACA will shift the provision of health-
care in several important ways that impact fiduciary law and ERISA.
First, it “will shift influence over physicians’ medical decisions to-
wards group-based decision-making, and away from considerations
that focus solely on an individual patient.”137  The use of “quality mea-
131. Matthew, supra note 4, at 723 (“Expanding the role of fiduciary law in health
policy will, I assert, determine the extent to which the government’s reform will,
in fact, ‘still work for the people.’”).
132. William Pierron & Paul Fronstin, ERISA Pre-Emption: Implications for Health
Reform and Coverage, ISSUE BRIEF, (Emp. Benefit Research Inst., D.C.), Feb.
2008, at 1, 9, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/BW5N-CB7R.
133. Id. at 9, 11 (noting that the 132.8 million number may be slightly high because it
includes church plan members who were difficult to identify and exclude).
134. Id. at 11.
135. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, INSURANCE COVERAGE PROVISIONS OF THE AFFORDABLE
CARE ACT—CBO’S APRIL 2014 BASELINE, at 3 tbl.2 (2014), archived at http://per
ma.unl.edu/8VLR-2W5L.
136. Id.
137. Matthew, supra note 4, at 743.
546 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:511
sures,” “clinical practice guidelines,” and new medical centers focused
on care proven across large swaths of the population will accelerate
this trend.138  Second, organizations—rather than individual physi-
cians—will now “control costs, quality, and access to health care.”139
“[B]ecause the ACA reflects a socio-political shift towards focusing on
the health of populations rather than only on the health of individual
patients, fiduciary law must speak to the public health concerns of
populations, not just individual patients.”140
The shifting focus to the health of larger populations instead of in-
dividuals is the latest manifestation of the problem presented by mass
fiduciaries with insufficient accountability.  Just as in the case of pen-
sion plan fiduciaries representing a diverse group of participants who
value differently the tradeoff between current wages and future pen-
sions, health plan fiduciaries represent a diverse population with dif-
fering health concerns and priorities.  As Matthew states:
The question of who can represent the patient understates the reality that the
patient is an aggregated population.  This population is comprised of the em-
ployed and the unemployed; citizens and aliens; adults and children; the
wealthy, the poor, and those in between; the young and the elderly; the very
healthy and the very ill; and those of different racial, cultural, and religious
backgrounds.  In other words, the patients who consume health care are a
collective principal population with divergent and sometimes competing
interests.141
Perhaps the main reason for those who view the ACA as purely an
exercise of cost shifting and containment to develop a better frame-
work for mass fiduciary relationships in health law is because of the
impact health care has on the economy and on society in other ways.
From a financial perspective, 17.9% of GDP in this country was spent
138. See id. (predicting that the ACA will reward use of “quality measures” and
“clinical practice guidelines,” and “establish[ ] new centers to research, dissemi-
nate, and train practitioners to use innovative methodologies, technologies, and
best practices that have been proven effective over time with diverse patient
populations”).
139. Id. at 743.  Note, however, that to a large extent this was already occurring under
health insurance plans covered by ERISA.
140. Id. at 744; see id. at 769 (“Significantly, patients and their physician agents are
increasingly less likely to be engaged in the one-on-one agency relationship that
has provided the prototypical agency model.  Today, the patient in the fiduciary
medicine model must be seen as a member of a group of principals that distantly
controls many different providers through various agency and sub-agency ar-
rangements that includes payers, managed care organizations, hospitals, insur-
ers, health plans, long-term care facilities, home health agencies, pharmaceutical
firms and physicians. MCOs create networks to serve aggregated groups of pa-
tients who seek services through employers or other aggregating institutions.
Employers go into the market to obtain insurance products on behalf of groups of
employees.”).  Although Matthew discusses the doctor-patient fiduciary relation-
ship, these words are equally applicable to ERISA fiduciary law.
141. Id. at 769–70.
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on healthcare in 2012.142  While many consider that to be an un-
healthy amount of expenditure that crowds out other sectors of the
economy, a large percentage of our economy is currently reliant on
health spending.  If the beneficiaries of health insurance lose faith in
fiduciaries as a result of improper accountability and conflicts of inter-
est, an important economic sector may decline and certainly more
money will be spent on regulation as the complaints become a ground-
swell of outrage.  Preemptive fixes are likely to be far less expensive.
So, how do we fix the problems in our current fiduciary regime gov-
erning access to healthcare through private health insurance?143  All
of the solutions I propose in the next Part seek to fix the accountability
framework through ERISA.  National regulation of private health
plans to date has occurred through ERISA.  Rather than starting from
scratch, it is more expedient to fix what is broken.  Finally, the his-
toric connection between the employment relationship and access to
health insurance is what makes ERISA the proper place to locate ex-
panded fiduciary duties for an expanded healthcare system, even as
142. Health Expenditure, Total (% of GDP), WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/
indicator/SH.XPD.TOTL.ZS (last visited Jan. 16, 2016), archived at http://perma
.unl.edu/EQJ4-WLS5; see Victor R. Fuchs, Why Do Other Rich Nations Spend so
Much Less on Healthcare?, THE ATLANTIC (July 23, 2014), http://www.theatlantic
.com/business/archive/2014/07/why-do-other-rich-nations-spend-so-much-less-on-
healthcare/374576/, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/PS8Q-6KVS.
143. Matthew, focusing on the healthcare itself instead of the access to such care, pro-
poses a “fiduciary medicine model” as a framework for the implementation of the
ACA.  Matthew, supra note 4, at 718.  One aspect of Matthew’s model is to make
“all major participants in the health care industry” subject to fiduciary duties
already existing in this field. Id.  “[T]he fiduciary medicine model might reach
beyond physicians and individual patients to require skill, competency, loyalty,
and good faith from hospitals, home health agencies, pharmaceutical companies,
nursing homes, employers, and a host of other agents.” Id. at 720.
In summary, the fiduciary medicine model is based on these four funda-
mental principles: first, agency is the primary fiduciary relationship that
characterizes the treatment relationship between medical providers and
their patients, thus agency law is the body of rules that should govern
these relationships.  Second, while the law of agency governs most medi-
cal treatment relationships, the law of trusts governs those health care
relationships that dispose of property, such as the role of health plan
administrators who collect premiums and pay claims.  Third, fiduciary
law provides the substantive and procedural legal rules needed to align
the diverse interests of patients who enroll, subscribe, or are benefi-
ciaries under contracts with integrated health care organizations.
Fourth, when the state and federal governments manage health care
markets as payers, regulators, educators, and researchers, the state
owes fiduciary duties of loyalty, good faith, and due care to its citizens.
Regulation based upon these seemingly straightforward four principles
will hold providers and payers accountable to the underlying intent and
objectives they have already articulated for themselves.
Id. at 785.
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more individuals gain access to health insurance outside of
employment.144
V. A FRAMEWORK FOR THE COLLECTIVE FIDUCIARY
As more individuals and entities are brought within ERISA’s fidu-
ciary ambit as a result of ACA penalties for employers who do not offer
health insurance, accountability will be difficult to come by unless
changes are made.  Under the ACA, “[P]rivate health insurance serves
a function similar to that of worker compensation insurance, unem-
ployment insurance, Social Security, and Medicare; that is to say, it
ensures that those in need of assistance have access to a source of
funding for that aid.”145  If private actors are to serve a public goal
and forgo conflicting self-interest, a better system of accountability is
needed.  ERISA-covered health plans remain the main source of
health insurance for the non-elderly.  It is only through this lens that
public goals can unite an insurance system cobbled together from pub-
lic and private plans.
Scholars more often explore the issue of collective accountability
through the lens of corporate law.146  As Darian Ibrahim writes:
An individual focus does not allow a director to hide behind her fellow direc-
tors’ compliance, but instead deems her singular breach of sufficient gravity to
jeopardize the board’s functioning and warrant legal sanctions.  A collective
focus, on the other hand, will serve to insulate any one director’s wrongdoing
provided the remaining directors complied with their fiduciary duties.147
Ibrahim’s focus is on whether to hold the individual or a larger body
accountable, not about the number of people to whom they are ac-
144. See Maher, supra note 99, at 656 (“Because many more people were covered by
employment-sponsored insurance rather than individual insurance, as a practical
matter, ERISA has been much more significant in defining health insurance rem-
edies than has state law.”).  Although Matthew identifies agency law as the ap-
propriate basis for fiduciary obligations in healthcare, I find her arguments for
the distinction of trust law and agency law in this case to be without any true
effect in application. See Matthew, supra note 4, at 745–46 (“Agency principles
delineate the full range of fiduciary relationships among providers, payers, ad-
ministrators, health plans, employers, and insurers, and patients in the health
care market . . . .”).  What she dubs property-based rights to health benefits under
trust law can, and frequently do, prevent access to healthcare and impede the
relationship of physician and patient.
145. Mariner, supra note 112, at 201.
146. See Darian M. Ibrahim, Individual or Collective Liability for Corporate Direc-
tors?, 93 IOWA L. REV. 929 (2008) (“More broadly, the unexplored question within
fiduciary duty law is this: how are outcomes affected when, although all directors
vote the same way, some do so in compliance with their fiduciary duties while
others do not?  Should director liability be assessed individually or collectively?”);
Frankel, supra note 49, at 1254 (discussing how the market functions to regulate
relationships involving corporate “public” fiduciaries even without default fiduci-
ary duties—although she finds that regulation to be insufficient).
147. Ibrahim, supra note 146, at 933.
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countable.  Yet, in either case, a choice of a collective framework has
important implications for an enforcement regime.  In the context of
health insurance and ERISA fiduciaries, this results in not only the
similar question of who should be held accountable—the larger enti-
ties administering benefit plans or the individual fiduciaries who
make the benefit determinations—but also what they should be held
accountable for—incorrectly denying individual benefit claims or de-
nying too many claims or comparable claims in the aggregate.  It is
the latter question that I think is of greater concern because only by
focusing on this question can the end goal of near-universal access to
healthcare be achieved.148
In the past, Congress and the courts provided little oversight of
ERISA fiduciaries in part because of the need to persuade employers
to provide employees with health insurance where there were no pub-
lic programs to fill the gap and the market for individual insurance
was weak.149  With the growth of the exchanges under the ACA, this
viable alternative means that government actors need to be less afraid
that employers will stop offering health insurance to their employees
and can stop bending over backwards to leave conflicted fiduciaries
with open discretion when making benefit determinations.
The challenge then for any proposed revision to ERISA’s fiduciary
framework is to balance responsibility to the individual whose bene-
fits are in question with responsibility to the larger populations that
are the focus of the ACA and efforts to reform healthcare in this coun-
try.  As Brendan Maher and Peter Stris explain in an article on the
need for structural reform of ERISA, “It is difficult to overstate the
magnitude of expectation uncertainty associated with the promise of
‘medically necessary’ care.  To put it mildly, it dwarfs the expectation
uncertainty present in all other benefit promises.”150  And decision
148. On the first question of who should be held accountable, Ibrahim notes that
courts support an individual focus on fiduciary breaches for the duty of loyalty
and a more collective approach for breaches of the duty of care, and he argues in
favor of such a duty-specific approach. See Ibrahim, supra note 146, at 933–34
(“This Article favors a duty-specific answer to the individual/collective question
on both descriptive and normative grounds.  First, it shows that courts generally
have focused on the board as a whole in duty of care cases, and on directors as
individuals in duty of loyalty cases.  Second, this Article argues that courts have
been correct in drawing this duty-based distinction because it strikes the proper
balance between the board’s authority and its accountability in each case.”).
149. See Maher, supra note 99, at 666 (“When assessing questions about the contour of
the ERISA benefit denial remedy, judges would have been hard pressed to ignore
the consequences of interpreting the remedy expansively.  If employers were de-
terred from offering insurance because of the cost and uncertainty associated
with generous remedies—for example, runaway damage awards for pain and suf-
fering—then quite literally many millions of Americans would have become una-
ble to obtain health insurance.”).
150. Brendan S. Maher & Peter K. Stris, ERISA & Uncertainty, 88 WASH. U. L. REV.
433, 462 (2010).
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makers can reasonably disagree about whether to provide benefits be-
cause there are consequences associated with providing costly treat-
ments with limited health consequences.151
In this Part, I explore three possible changes to ERISA’s fiduciary
decision-making framework: (1) enhanced external review beyond that
required by the ACA; (2) altering federal ERISA common law to re-
duce the discretion accorded to fiduciary decisions on benefit claims;
and (3) caps on benefit claim denials set by government actors and
enforced on appeal.  I find that only the last proposal meets the need
for collective consistency and fairness demanded by the ACA’s goal of
near-universal access to healthcare.
A. A Proposal for an Enhanced External Review Process
Prior to the ACA, forty-three states had laws providing for an ex-
ternal review process for benefit decisions made by administrators of
health insurance plans.  Some states, however, limited access to par-
ticular types of plans (such as HMOs) or claims (denial of benefits be-
cause of disagreement of what was “medically necessary”).  Filing fees
and quick filing deadlines discouraged many from taking advantage of
this remedy.  In addition, many states allowed insurance companies to
select an Independent Review Organization (IRO) from a list, thus po-
tentially decreasing the neutrality of the decision makers.152  And any
advantage beneficiaries gained was mollified by the need to jump
through yet another hoop to receive their rightful access to benefits.
Expanding on the Supreme Court’s decision in Rush v. Prudential
HMO, Inc. v. Moran,153 which declared that an Illinois statute requir-
ing independent review of conflicts between HMOs and physicians re-
garding appropriate treatment was not preempted under ERISA, the
ACA requires health plans and insurance issuers to comply with any
established state external review process or to implement an external
review process that complies with new regulations if the applicable
state law does not establish such a process or the plan self-insures and
is not subject to state insurance law.154  Participants in plans that
151. Id. at 462–64; see Vukadin, supra note 31, at 1202 (noting that in addition to
disagreements about what treatments are medically necessary or experimental,
up to 20% of health benefit claims are decided incorrectly).
152. Wade S. Hauser, Note, Does Iowa’s Health Care External Reviews Process Replace
Common-Law Rights?, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1401, 1405–08 (2014) (exploring Iowa’s
amended external reviews process after the ACA and judging it to be a cumula-
tive remedy for insureds instead of an exclusive remedy that barred subsequent
access to the courts).
153. 536 U.S. 355 (2002).
154. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-19(b) (2012) (requiring an external review process that “at a
minimum, includes the consumer protections set forth in the Uniform External
Review Model Act promulgated by the National Association of Insurance Com-
missioners”).  In a technical release issued in June 2011, the Department of La-
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self-insure and are therefore subject to the new federal external re-
view process gained a new remedy.155  Guidance from the Department
of Health and Human Services (HHS), however, allows plans to meet
the requirement of compliance with a federal external review process
by following the state statute or contracting with a private Indepen-
dent Review Organization instead.156
It is questionable whether the new external review requirement
under the ACA is beneficial to plan participants, however, because it
adds yet another layer of review that participants can only access af-
ter exhausting internal claims procedures within the insurance com-
pany or administrator of the plan.157  Both plan sponsors and
insurance companies benefit from the new appeals process because
claimants drop out with each level of appeal—leaving fewer to file
claims in court.158  Many participants drop out of the process before
ever appealing their denied benefit claims, and adding to the appeal
burden will not help.159  ERISA’s legislative history indicates that
Congress wanted beneficiaries to have easy access to courts and did
not wish to add extra steps to claims procedures.160  Perhaps learning
from past mistakes on this point, courts have been reluctant to rule in
favor of health plans that have tried to force their participants to use
bor reiterated the requirement that every state must have a state-regulated
external review process that meets the sixteen minimum consumer protection
standards outlined in the release. U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., TECHNICAL RELEASE NO.
2011-02, GUIDANCE ON EXTERNAL REVIEW FOR GROUP HEALTH PLANS AND HEALTH
INSURANCE ISSUERS OFFERING GROUP AND INDIVIDUAL HEALTH COVERAGE, AND
GUIDANCE FOR STATES ON STATE EXTERNAL REVIEW PROCESSES 2 (2011) [hereinaf-
ter TECHNICAL RELEASE 2011-02]; see Maher, supra note 99, at 691–92 (“The Su-
preme Court, however, has made clear that, as a general matter, external review
is outside conflict preemption.  The ACA codifies that thinking; indeed, the Model
Act used by the ACA as a referent envisions external reviewers supplying no
Firestone deference to internal reviews.”).
155. Insurers and plans—including self-funded plans subject to ERISA—in states
whose external review processes do not meet federal requirements must partici-
pate in a federally-administered external review process managed by the Office of
Personnel Management or through an accredited IRO. TECHNICAL RELEASE 2011-
02, supra note 154, at 7–8; see Hauser, supra note 152, at 1410.
156. TECHNICAL RELEASE 2011-02, supra note 154, at 7–8.
157. Vukadin, supra note 31, at 1203–04 (“As a practical matter, is a further level of
review—usually available only after exhaustion of internal levels of review—the
kind of reform that will make a difference to most plan participants?”).
158. Id. at 1204 (describing the additional “winnowing” effect of a new external review
process on top of the fact that “all but a few plan participants fail to complete the
arduous appeal process available to them even before this new, external level of
review”).
159. See id. at 1205.
160. See Wooten, supra note 98, at 587 (“Moreover, the legislative history of ERISA
also reveals a trend in congressional decision-making away from requiring par-
ticipants and beneficiaries to jump through a hoop before going to court.”).
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the external review process instead of making it an optional method of
relief.161
The rules as currently written do nothing more than place another
obstacle in the path of participants seeking access to their benefits.
External review boards cannot grant damages162 or otherwise com-
pensate appellees for the time and effort spent to exhaust their op-
tions through the internal review process—within which there are
typically two rounds of appeals—and pursue another appeal through
the external review process.  Because fiduciaries know that even par-
ticipants with valid claims drop off at each level of appeal, an extra
hurdle increases their incentive to deny valid claims since fewer will
be appealed in court and costs to fight at each level of appeal are dis-
counted by the percentage who never appeal or drop off at each level of
appeal.  This clearly does not bring collective accountability.
My proposal would be to (1) make all benefit claim denials above a
certain dollar threshold subject to a mandatory external review pro-
cess and (2) ensure that there are no ties between the fiduciaries and
the independent decision makers completing the external review.  On
the first point, fiduciaries might make different decisions if they knew
that all of those decisions would be subject to a meaningful review.  By
requiring all benefit claim denials above a certain de minimis thresh-
old to be reviewed externally, the impetus for supervising fiduciary
decisions would not need to come from plan participants who are often
uninformed about the procedure for appeals or sick and unable to fully
engage in an appeals process.  Recognizing that this proposal is costly,
plans could be authorized to eliminate all internal review procedures
in favor of this one, automatic external level of review.  The dollar
threshold could also be adjusted upwards to find an appeals process
with a reasonable cost.
On the second point, the only way that external review processes
have any value is if we can eliminate the conflicts of interest that
plague the current internal review procedures.  Health plans that
choose to contract with IROs are required to contract with three IROs
and rotate assignments among them.  These IROs, however, have had
difficulties keeping up with demand, and according to Department of
Labor guidance plans can avoid enforcement actions by demonstrating
161. See, e.g., Bailey v. Chevron Corp. Omnibus Healthcare Plan, No. SACV 13-1366-
JLS (ANx), 2014 WL 2219216, *2 (C.D. Cal. May 7, 2014) (finding that although
plans may be required to implement an external review process, this does not
mean that they can require their plan participants to use the external review
process before resorting to litigation); Goldman v. BCBSM Found., 841 F. Supp.
2d 1021, 1026 (E.D. Mich. 2012) (holding that, given the language of the plan’s
benefit guide, the plan participant was only required to exhaust the internal re-
view process and was not required to seek external review by state regulators
before seeking judicial remedies).
162. Maher, supra note 99, at 671.
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that they are taking other steps to ensure that their external review
process was independent and without bias.163
Asking any group to police themselves is obviously fraught with
problems, particularly where that group has a financial incentive for
bad behavior such as incorrectly denying valid claims or even merely
questionable ones.  If the fiduciaries themselves select the decision
makers, as the ACA and many states allow, there is no hope for a truly
fair hearing of the benefit claim.  Even if fiduciaries do not select the
decision makers and they are instead randomly assigned, the fact that
the fiduciaries are repeat players and may have a good working rela-
tionship with the decision makers introduces bias and makes this so-
lution less desirable.  In addition, the focus with this proposal is still
on the individual beneficiary and the individual claim, not on ensur-
ing consistency or overall fairness.
B. A Proposal to Alter Federal ERISA Common Law
Many scholars have argued that the federal courts were wrong in
their early ERISA cases governing benefit claims.  They argue that
courts should not have (1) required that claimants exhaust internal
review procedures before seeking redress in the courts, (2) applied a
deferential “arbitrary and capricious” standard of review to fiduciary
decisions, or (3) limited their review to the administrative record of
that one claimant.
First, nowhere did Congress indicate that claimants were required
to exhaust internal review procedures prior to appealing the denial of
a benefits claim to the courts.164  Focusing on efficiency and cost con-
cerns, the courts required participants to jump through this extra
hoop by appealing to the fiduciary who has already denied the exact
claim previously.165
Second, in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch,166 the Supreme
Court held that the standard of review for benefit claims—where the
plan documents reserved the fiduciary’s right to use discretion to de-
cide benefit claims—is the same arbitrary and capricious standard
163. TECHNICAL RELEASE 2011-02, supra note 154, at 8–9.
164. ERISA § 503, 29 U.S.C. § 1133 (2012) (“[E]very employee benefit plan shall . . . (2)
afford a reasonable opportunity to any participant whose claim for benefits has
been denied for a full and fair review by the appropriate named fiduciary of the
decision denying the claim.”). But see Wooten, supra note 98, at 578–79 (noting
recent comments by congressional staffers involved with drafting ERISA that
they did intend for claimants to exhaust internal review procedures before seek-
ing judicial redress).
165. See Roth, supra note 46, at 263–65 (“Courts relied on Congress’ supposed concern
with efficient resolution of ERISA claims—favoring efficiency over correcting
flawed decisions.”).
166. 489 U.S. 101 (1989).
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that decision makers in government agencies are reviewed under.167
Judges then cannot overturn a fiduciary’s decision on a benefit claim
unless it is arbitrary and capricious, even if the judge thinks the deci-
sion is wrong.  The power of judges over ERISA benefit claims has
been largely abrogated then, as all well-drafted benefit plans now in-
clude such a reservation of rights for the fiduciary.
Third, and most relevant to my discussion of the need for a collec-
tive framework, courts have limited their review of benefit claims to
the claimant’s administrative record.  Therefore, even sick plan par-
ticipants fighting for important medical treatments cannot obtain dis-
covery or use evidence outside of the administrative record presented
by the fiduciary to challenge the decision.168  This is the case in the
vast majority of ERISA claims, with the exception of a few cases where
clear conflicts of interest beyond the standard cost-containment moti-
vation are shown.
This last point means that statistical evidence showing that a fidu-
ciary denies a disproportionate number of claims or unevenly rejects
claims for a particular type of participant or beneficiary is not wel-
come in the courts.  In fact, the courts would have no way of knowing
what a disproportionate number of claim denials is because they do
not require the fiduciary to produce evidence of how many similar
claims are denied (within the company or across similar companies).
There is not even a simple, anecdotal comparison made between an
individual benefit claim before the court and other claims made to
that fiduciary.  There is no collective accountability in this process.
Congress could step in to alter federal common law in this area and
make the process easier on individual claimants.  The fact remains,
however, that for over forty years, Congress has not done so.  The odds
that Congress will revisit this issue in exactly this way after many
calls for it to do so went unheeded are low.  Perhaps this is because it
is hard to rally Congress behind the idea of intervening on a small
scale, in a way that only impacts the comparatively few individual
claimants who appear before the courts.  In addition, without looking
to issues of collective benefit outcomes, the decisions in these cases are
unlikely to be overturned because there is great difficulty in determin-
ing a “correct” decision on an individual level when looking at ambigu-
ous plan terms.  My last proposal, however, takes the problems that
resulted in calls to alter federal ERISA common law and places them
within the collective fiduciary framework forming after the ACA—per-
167. Id. at 109.
168. Mark D. DeBofsky, What Process Is Due in the Adjudication of ERISA Claims?,
40 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 811, 812 (2007) (noting that courts have not analyzed
whether claimants have any due process rights in the adjudication of their bene-
fit claims).
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haps making it more likely that Congress will be moved to act now or
in the future.
C. A Proposal for Statistical Limits on Benefit Denials
I argue here that what is needed to ensure that fiduciaries protect,
not hinder, access to healthcare is to focus on aggregate benefit deci-
sions and aggregate accountability.169  All the procedural safeguards
and fantastical beliefs that fiduciaries can wear two different hats do
not change the fact that private fiduciaries face a conflict of interest
under ERISA and the ACA.  They are supposed to act for the exclusive
benefit of plan participants and beneficiaries but face pressure to con-
tain costs to advance the goals of for-profit institutions.
I propose that legislation be enacted to allow HHS to set caps on
the percentage of benefit claims (based on dollar value) that fiducia-
ries can deny.  This will ensure that government actors tailor the work
of fiduciaries to meet public goals.  After all, private entities are profit-
ing from what is now a social insurance program—from a system that
many other countries have made entirely public.  The government
should demand some accountability.
For now, participant grievances would still be addressed through
ERISA’s current appeals processes, however.  Focusing on the current
appeals procedures, as onerous as they may be, allows insurance com-
panies and administrators to maintain control, authority, and effi-
ciency over the majority of benefit claims that are clearly spelled out
under the terms of the policy.  Obviously, the harm in this is that some
participants whose claims are wrongfully denied initially based on the
new aggregate data collected will decide not to appeal, whether con-
sciously or because they do not fully understand their rights.  Yet a
more fair appeals process will likely result in more appeals in the long
term.
HHS would decide how to set caps based on data reported by
health insurers and administrators on all claims decided internally.
HHS would be authorized to determine the proper data set used to
calculate average claims denials.  For example, there may be regional
variations in benefit decisions initially until the government can work
towards a more uniform healthcare system.  More importantly, the
question will arise whether the denial of a claim for a breast cancer
169. It is of course difficult to have a collective fiduciary framework if not everyone has
equal access to health insurance and healthcare. See Emily Whelan Parento &
Lawrence Gostin, Better Health, but Less Justice: Widening Health Disparities
After National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 27 NOTRE DAME
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 481 (2013) (discussing disparities in access to health-
care and in health more broadly based on which states are opting out of the Medi-
caid expansion under the ACA).
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treatment should be compared to denials for all breast cancer patients
or for all adult cancer patients.
Finally, because we are now focused on systemic issues of inequal-
ity within our healthcare system, data should also be collected from
institutional fiduciaries on the gender and racial background of par-
ticipants whose initial claims are denied and the percentage who do
not appeal that denial.170  The cap on benefit denials would require
that fiduciaries stay under the cap for both male and female insureds
and among different races.  Inequality in claims denials between those
categories would be required to stay within a certain margin of error
as well.  So, an institution could not stay under the aggregate cap
while denying many more benefit claims for blacks than for whites.
Special notices can be sent to those whose claims are denied to make it
easier for them to understand the new rights accorded to them if they
appeal.171
Fiduciaries who exceed the HHS caps will be subject to large penal-
ties that continue to accumulate while they are noncompliant.  Penal-
ties should be a percentage of profits rather than a multiple of the
claim value to ensure that fiduciaries cannot continue to deny small
dollar value claims that add up to big bucks in the aggregate without
recompense.  Proper deterrence requires larger sanctions.172
Assuming that a benefit claim is denied and appealed to the courts,
I would include a requirement that federal courts hearing benefit
claims review only the question of statistical compliance with the
HHS claim denial caps de novo to ensure compliance.  The insurance
company or administrator would be required to supply the court with
the relevant data on its benefit claim denials broken down by gender
and race as well as the relevant caps set by HHS.  If the insurer or
administrator is within a certain distance of the HHS cap, federal
judges would be required to decide the entire substance of the benefit
claim de novo—with no deference accorded to the fiduciary’s earlier
decision on appeal.173
170. See Vukadin, supra note 31, at 1208 (“The regulations do not, however, require
any particular processes or safeguards to ensure that decision making is consis-
tent—the means of accomplishing consistent decision making are left to
payors.”).
171. See id. at 1206 (noting the need to “increase consumer participation” with notices
designed to inform participants and beneficiaries of their rights and about the
appeals process).
172. See id. at 1220 (“Thus, even when a claim is improperly and repeatedly denied, a
participant who sues in federal court and wins still only receives the value of the
benefit.  The payor’s improper and repeated denials are not separately punished
at all.”).
173. This buffer zone near the HHS cap in which federal judges are required to give
benefit determinations extra scrutiny also helps allay concerns that shifting sta-
tistics could result in inequality between claimants who file similar appeals at
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Not only is this more likely to contain benefit denials on appeal,
but judges would finally be forced to address the merits of at least a
very small portion of ERISA benefit claims.  Some government actor
would be forced to look into whether benefit denials are correct at
least once in a while.  Up to this point, even that much has not hap-
pened.174  My proposal reduces not only the discretion accorded to fi-
duciaries but also the discretion left to federal judges under ERISA.175
This proposal ensures that our system of fiduciary accountability
moves towards a focus on a larger population and ensuring equality of
healthcare access; it also maintains efficiency by allowing fiduciaries
to make initial benefit determinations and follow current appeals pro-
cedures in place (which winnow down the number of appeals).  Fiduci-
aries even maintain the deference typically accorded by federal judges
where they stay under the cap for denials of benefit appeals set by
HHS and under the buffer zone.
Of course my proposal is imperfect.  It does not alter the fact that
most claimants never appeal their benefit denials at all—let alone to a
federal court.  Yet the more carefully appeals are monitored and the
more fair they appear, the more likely participants are to appeal their
claims.  Although many argue (and I have argued in the past) that an
arbitrary and capricious standard of review is inappropriate in the
case of an ERISA benefit claim, these arguments have been unsuc-
cessful for four decades, and it is clearly time to consider more dra-
matic steps to protect beneficiaries, particularly in the healthcare
context where the stakes are so high and additional protection is
needed to prevent irreparable harm.  By protecting collective goals, we
protect individual claimants.
VI. CONCLUSION
ERISA came to fruition because the risks associated with pension
loss were too much for workers to bear, and the public took notice.176
different times, when the changing statistics could result in different decisions in
their cases.
174. Vukadin, supra note 31, at 1205 (“Furthermore, the external review rules do not
address another major failing of the ERISA claims process, namely that there is
no direct, negative, and substantial consequence of payors’ incorrect denial of le-
gitimate healthcare claims.”).  Vukadin proposes interest and penalties on any
benefit claims overturned during the external review process to deter claims from
being decided incorrectly initially. Id.
175. See Maher, supra note 99, at 678 (“A fair presumption is that the foregoing extra-
statutory concerns—diminished relative to ERISA, but not weakened so much as
to fade into insignificance—will influence judicial interpretation of the ACA, both
with respect to the content of the law itself and the degree to which judges will be
willing to interpret it to prevent states from pursuing policies that thwart or
undo litigation reform.”).
176. Employees lost all or a portion of their expected pensions when: (1) plan manag-
ers “misuse[d] or [stole] assets” (agency risk); (2) the employees quit or were fired
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After ERISA, employers systematically shifted those risks back to
workers.  Employers avoided default and forfeiture risks by shifting
their defined benefit pension plans to defined contribution plans.
When pension costs went up because employers had to maintain a
higher level of funding and many employees no longer forfeited their
benefits, employers reacted by paying small sums (if any) into tax-
deferred plans with no commitment to continue paying past the termi-
nation of employment.
What has happened with group health plans subject to ERISA is
the same basic process.  As healthcare costs rose, employers sought
cost-containment measures and fiduciaries began to ration healthcare
in ways that plan participants and beneficiaries do not fully under-
stand until their claims are denied.  As the ACA uses non-ERISA
plans to increase health insurance coverage to near-universal levels,
ERISA plans must be made to fit this larger goal.  Where fiduciaries
can systematically deny benefit claims to limit plan expenses, those
with employer-sponsored health insurance lack full access to their
health insurance.  To make public and private health insurance pro-
grams work together to achieve public goals, consistent and coherent
fiduciary accountability is key.
from employment (forfeiture risk); or (3) an employer failed to properly fund the
benefit plan and faced hardship itself (default risk). WOOTEN, supra note 79, at 3.
